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# NIGERIA ADVANCE PROGRAM MIDTERM EVALUATION

FEBRUARY 2009

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## **DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

AAIN	ActionAid International, Nigeria
ABGREMO	Akpabuyo Bakassi Green Movement (aka known as Green Concern Movement)
ADVANCE	Advocacy, Awareness and Civic Empowerment
BTAN	Budget Transparency Network
CAPP	Community Action for Popular Participation
CISLAC	Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Center
CLEEN	Center for Law Enforcement Education
CRAI	Citizens Rights Awareness Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
DG	Democracy and Governance
DRG	Debt Relief Gains
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
EG	Economic Growth
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FEC	Federal Executive Council
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FOMWAN	Federation of Muslim Women Associations of Nigeria
GON	Government of Nigeria
IAGGA	International Anti-Corruption and Good Governance Act
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices Commission
IFES	International Foundation of Electoral System
IMC	Interfaith Mediation Center
INEC	Independent National Election Commission
IRI	International Republican Institute
JDPC	Justice Development and Peace Commission
LMS	Leadership Management and Sustainability
ISO	Intermediary Service Organization
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MER	Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting
MULAC	Muslim League for Accountability
NBA	Nigerian Bar Association
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NPC	National Planning Commission
NPWP	National Procurement Watch Platform
NLC	Nigeria Labor Congress
NUJ	Nigerian Union of Journalists
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
P/DG	Peace and Democratic Governance
PABA	People affected by AIDS
PPA	Public Procurement Act
PPDC	Public & Private Development Centre

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**Nigeria ADVANCE Program  
Midterm Evaluation Report**

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PWYP	Publish What You Pay Coalition
RFTOP	Request for Task Order Proposal
SEEDS	State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
SRIP	Support to Reforming Institutions Programme
SO	United States Agency for International Development Strategic Objective
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WANGONeT	West Africa Nongovernmental Organization Network
ZCC	Zero Corruption Coalition

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On behalf of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Democracy International (DI) conducted an evaluation of the USAID-funded Advocacy, Awareness and Civic Empowerment (ADVANCE) civil society program in Nigeria. The ADVANCE program, implemented by Pact/Nigeria, was initiated on May 23, 2005 and is scheduled to conclude on May 22, 2010. This evaluation was intended to assess program performance by reviewing ADVANCE's programming, management and implementation approaches, to present lessons learned, and to provide recommendations to improve program implementation. The evaluation was to specifically address the following queries, outlined in USAID's Request for Task Order Proposals (RFTOP):

- Whether the program has achieved its specific program goals;
- The extent of the program's contribution to the broader USAID/Nigeria Peace and Democratic Governance (P/DG) strategy, including synergies with other P/DG programs;
- Potential changes to the program for its remaining years to better meet its program goals, strengthen its contribution to a broader peace and democratic governance strategy, and to promote greater synergy with other mission programs; and
- How the program is contributing to broader civil society efforts to hold government accountable.

In addition, 13 specific questions were posed directing this inquiry to assess the partnerships, synergies and unintended consequences of the program. These questions are individually addressed below in section IX.

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON PROGRAMMING, MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

- Despite the changes in Country Representatives and key technical staff, Pact has largely done well implementing ADVANCE given the resource limitations, obstacles and geographically and socially diverse environment it faces. Its success is particularly visible in its approach to providing institutional capacity building training and mentoring to its subgrantees, with most ADVANCE Nigerian partners lauding Pact's unique skills and supportive mentoring approach.
- Pact has been successful in adjusting its operations, management and programming to accommodate changes in the operating environment and the need to incorporate additional programmatic activities.
- Inclusion of training and technical assistance to religious NGOs (Interfaith Mediation Centre) and networks (MULAC) in the northwest geopolitical area has yielded an increased positive perception of engagement with Pact and international donor activities among these groups. This has also yielded impressive results in strengthening the internal institutional capacity for those organ-

izations, both in their operations and in designing and implementing programming involving religious leaders in democracy building activities (e.g. civic education around the elections).

- While institutional subgrantees have praised strengthening activities for supporting substantial development in their organizational capacity, these activities have been narrow in scope and have concentrated primarily on building those administrative, financial and management skills needed for ADVANCE subgrant project implementation.
- Activities that focus on working with coalitions and networks to understand their roles and to engage and strengthen their constituencies have not been included within ADVANCE’s CSO institutional strengthening activities. In discussions with Pact it was evident that this type of analysis or work has not been considered.
- ADVANCE non-service-delivery NGOs (e.g. public policy and watchdog groups) working on budget transparency and anticorruption issues struggle to connect their work to constituencies.
- Coalitions and networks focused on budget transparency and anticorruption largely serve the interests of their more established members. These networks and coalitions do not reach out to or actively engage with other segments of civil society (e.g., religious groups, professional associations, youth groups) which have overlapping interests and could support their efforts.
- There is a general consensus among Nigerian civil society stakeholders and this evaluation team that more must be done to “reach down” to larger segments of the population to involve them in advocacy.
- It was difficult for this evaluation to verify with any degree of certainty the effects of ADVANCE programming and the ADVANCE credited successes (e.g. ADVANCE’s role in the FY 2007 passage of the Fiscal Responsibility, Public Procurement and NEITI laws). As with other civil society programs aimed at improving various dimensions of governance, it was difficult to follow the causal connection between ADVANCE assistance and identified successes in Nigeria, or to determine what would be observed from Nigerian civil society advocacy activity in the absence of the ADVANCE program. A true impact evaluation would require a more rigorous Monitoring and Evaluation design from the start of the program.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2009 -2010 ADVANCE PROGRAMMING**

The following recommendations are discussed in more detail in Sections II through VIII of the report. The recommendation topics reflect USAID/Nigeria Mission requests for information on distinct program dimensions, as well as evaluation team suggestions for other areas of need not originally identified by the Mission. In making these recommendations, the evaluation team acknowledges that the ADVANCE program has been ongoing since May 2005 and is entering its final full year of program implementation, with

financial resource constraints and ongoing momentum in its programming. This midterm evaluation comes late in the program implementation cycle, during a period when USAID P/DG is also looking at ADVANCE programming in light of opportunities for complementary funding from a public-private partnership. In this period, data from a forthcoming consultant report on state-level opportunities and priorities for USAID/Nigeria programming is also expected to inform decision making regarding resource and programming allocation across states.<sup>1</sup> In the absence of this expanded information, the evaluation team recommends a few targeted adjustments to ADVANCE programming in the following areas:

### **More Effective Networks and Coalitions**

- Provide additional training and mentoring assistance to networks and coalitions on roles and fundamentals of these types of institutions.
- If financial resources are available, provide institution-building grants to the existing ADVANCE coalition and network partners to develop systems and services.
- Support the efforts of coalitions and networks to broaden their constituency base and network more effectively across states and across social and technical sectors.
- Collaborate with Oxfam-NOVIB in providing institutional strengthening support to Publish What You Pay (PWYP) as its newly elected leadership moves past difficult leadership and transparency issues and strives to rebuild credibility and effectiveness with its members and donors. This collaboration should focus on the improvement of internal management, strategic planning and campaign programming.
- The above-mentioned training, mentoring and grants should be streamed to networks and coalitions by selecting an issue for intensive subnational focus, which would serve as a vehicle to connect national level NGOs with civil society and citizens at state and local levels. One way to accomplish this goal might be to work with the stakeholders frequently mentioned in the context of NEITI.
- Work with existing ADVANCE coalition and network partners.

### **Sub-National Initiatives**

- Increase subnational level activities by continuing to strategically leverage and support ongoing ADVANCE anticorruption and budget advocacy activities (particularly NEITI).

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<sup>1</sup> The report will be written by Dr. Darren Kew.

- Link with USAID/Nigeria partners and other partners carrying out parallel initiatives.
- Consider budget tracking and advocacy as areas in which to increase ADVANCE subnational work.
- Integrate and coordinate ADVANCE state-level activities with any new USAID local governance initiatives. State and local governments operate a joint account. It is therefore essential that any USAID local governance initiatives working on budget transparency issues also coordinate activities with budget transparency initiatives on the state level.
- Seek to complement other donor efforts (e.g. EU-EDF and EIDHR programming; UNDP) by working in the same regions as these programs or on similar anticorruption and transparency issues.
- Support Nigerian NGOs' subnational efforts to connect with and include informal civil society and individual citizens.

### **National Initiatives**

- As programming increases on the subnational level, it should be reduced at the national level. ADVANCE financial and human resources are finite, and an increase in subnational work also dramatically affects the time involved in management and oversight of activities in geographical areas outside of Abuja.
- National level activities must focus on fewer issues. Key issues should be chosen from either advocacy for new legislation (e.g. Whistleblower act, FOI) or monitoring the implementation of recently passed laws (e.g. NEITI, Fiscal Responsibility). In interviews, program stakeholders expressed that they had difficulty understanding the dynamics between the Yara'dua government and ADVANCE advocacy activities around the passage of bills such as FOI. The evaluation team therefore recommends that the focus of activities be on the implementation of recently passed laws as a way of solidifying some good governance successes.

### **Cross-Sectoral Work**

- Increase cross-sectoral work with other USAID/Nigeria implementing partners, in conjunction with the above-mentioned strengthening of network and coalition activities and increasing ADVANCE subnational programming. Opportunities for and identification of this cross-sectoral work will only come from an increase in ADVANCE interaction with other programs and implementing partners outside of P/DG. Interaction is currently limited to P/DG implementing partners.

- There are potential opportunities for these cross-sectoral linkages, including collaboration on budget tracking and advocacy initiatives with USAID education and health programs, that should be considered.

### **Electoral Reform Work**

- As ADVANCE has experience working with NGOs focused on election civic education and advocacy activities, it should serve in a limited capacity as a nexus between these groups and implementing partners in Nigeria that conduct pre- and post-electoral programming. ADVANCE should discontinue its work with any election-focused programming to avoid the further diversion of resources away from previously planned ADVANCE activities.

### **Direct Contracting with Nigerian Institutions**

- USAID/Nigeria P/DG should develop a five-year plan for moving toward the goal of directly funding Nigerian P/DG civil society organizations (CSOs).
- ADVANCE should help in this process by first learning from other USG programs and other implementing partners about the approaches to preparing Nigerian institutions to receive direct funding. Then ADVANCE can help to establish a structured process to identify and mentor Nigerian CSOs working in P/DG program.
- CSO institutional capacity building Objective 1 activities should be broadened and considered strategically. They should also be introduced as not only an extension of and means to support anticorruption, electoral reform and budget advocacy activities, but also as a way to build the direct contracting capacity of Nigerian institutions based upon the process developed in coordination with USAID/Nigeria P/DG.

### **Measuring Program Impact**

- Greater emphasis should be placed on impact evaluation. With little more than a year of the program remaining, measuring impact should be focused in a limited fashion on new or nascent ADVANCE activities such as those recommended in this report. Good targets for measuring program impact include the development of networks and coalitions, the success of building vertical/horizontal linkages in coalitions and networks, and the value of cross sectoral synergies, to cite a few.
- Support should be requested from the new USAID/DCHA/DG evaluation initiative, which is available to help missions design new programs to allow for more rigorous evaluations.

## I. INTRODUCTION

### Structure/Political Environment

The emergence of democratic political processes in Nigeria in 1999 created a space for civil society involvement in democratic governance and in promoting people-centered development. This period has been described as a critical juncture for civil society groups in Nigeria. While civil society organizations fought for and helped to entrench democratic rule, they unfortunately lacked adequate capacity to continue to engage the democratic process. This created an urgent need to build the capacity of civil society, especially in the areas of legislative advocacy and engagement with various government reform programs. ADVANCE has played a critical role in building and strengthening the capacity of civil society to drive this process.

Three offices play key roles in fostering the executive agenda on issues related to civil society in Nigeria. These offices are the office of the Special Adviser to the President on Civil Society Relations, the office of the National Orientation Agency (NOA), and the National Planning Commission (NPC). Civil society organizations work with these government agencies to ensure public consultation and input in the delivery of government services and programs.

Nigeria has witnessed a number of significant government reforms, particularly before the inauguration of the present administration in May 2007. In 2005 the Paris Club granted debt relief amounting to 70 percent of Nigeria's \$36 billion in external debts. These debt relief gains (DRGs) were channeled to the development of socio-economic projects across the country. To ensure the proper utilization of these funds, civil society was engaged in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of projects executed with the DRGs. In 2006, Pact/USAID and DFID, in collaboration with Nigerian government, supported a capacity-building workshop for civil society engagement in the M&E of DRGs projects.

The current structure and political environment of Nigeria can be understood within the context of three streams of reform activities. These activities have affected the institutionalization of democracy and good governance in different sectors, and include state reforms (e.g. anticorruption, judicial reforms, privatization, pension reform, and due process, among others); socio-economic reforms (e.g. health, education, banking sectors, trafficking, and telecommunication); and political reforms (e.g. political parties, elections, the INEC, and a failed constitutional amendment to permit then-President Obasanjo to run for a third four-year term in office). Interestingly, civil society organizations played a watchdog role by monitoring these reforms' effect on the public. CSOs monitored and tracked the implementation of these reform programs, with some social critics and civil society activists arguing that most of the reforms were ill-motivated and designed to protect the selfish political and economic interests of the ruling class.

The effectiveness and future of these reforms became a major concern for a large segment of civil society due to the manner in which the present regime operates. The Yara'dua government does not appear to be building on the strengths of the reform struc-

tures of its predecessor. Civil society expected the present administration to address the weaknesses and the autocratic implementation of some of the previous reforms in order to strengthen institutional capacities to deliver good governance. Regrettably, as most civil society activists have argued, Yara’dua’s regime appears to have little direction or focus with regard to reforms. Though the administration claims to be pursuing a rule-of-law agenda, there is a widespread perception that reforms are being instituted in an undemocratic and nontransparent manner. For instance, the dramatic change in the antigraft war and the failure of the FOI and other pending bills in the National Assembly are among the major concerns of civil society.

### **POLITICAL REFORMS**

Civil society organizations played a significant role in political reform programs. Their engagement and interventions in the political reform process, with the support of a group at the National Assembly known as 2007 Movement, is one of the major successes of CSOs within the period under review, especially regarding their opposition to the third-term agenda of President Obasanjo. The failure of Obasanjo’s bid to extend his tenure for a third term led to the complete disruption of the constitutional amendment process at the National Assembly on May 6, 2006. CSO activities included intensive and massive advocacy and “sticking to issues” campaigns that were channeled toward thwarting a third-term bid by Obasanjo. Despite his failure to retain power, Obasanjo succeeded in orchestrating an April 2007 election widely perceived as unfair. Using the state apparatus and political machinery at his disposal, in the end he was able to impose on Nigerians his candidate for the presidency.

Civil society organizations were vocal in raising critical concerns regarding the April 2007 elections. Among the issues were whether the election would be free and fair considering the political situation in the country, which included political and extra-judicial killings. Other issues of concern included the credibility of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which civil society organizations perceived to be under the control of the Obasanjo’s administration and poised to steal the election through the so-called direct capturing voting machine. Likewise, the voter registration exercise and the screening of political candidates exposed the unpreparedness and administrative lapses of the INEC in the conduct of elections.

In a bid to improve the future administration of Nigeria’s elections, the current government constituted an Election Reform Committee (ERC), which includes civil society representatives on its oversight committee and aims to look critically at Nigeria’s electoral system and support the implementation of best practices. The committee successfully completed its work and submitted its report in December 2008. As civil society organizations patiently wait for the government to adopt and implement the recommendations of the ERC, they also need to re-strategize their approach to engaging the National Assembly, as it prepares to review the 1999 constitution later this year.

## **STATE REFORMS**

In his speech for the observance of Nigeria's 46th year of independence in 2006, former President Obasanjo expressed the need to enhance the functional capacity of state institutions. In the same vein, the then-Chief Justice of Nigeria Alfa Belgore expressed regret over the state of the Nigerian judiciary and called for far-reaching reforms. Among the state reforms so far have been the activities of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Some analysts allege, however, that the agency has been used to single out perceived critics of the government. Nonetheless, the agency has received numerous internal and external commendations. The present administration's removal and dismissal of the EFCC's former head, Nuhu Ribadu, from the police force is an ongoing contentious issue and seems to have created a divide between those in civil society who argue for and against Ribadu's dismissal from the force.

## **SOCIO-ECONOMIC REFORMS**

Nigeria continues to witness sluggish economic growth and increasing poverty, despite the huge funds invested in the country to attain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the health sector, there have been successes in the areas of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), in polio vaccination, and in the fight against fake drugs. The education sector has also seen improvements, though much of civil society strongly opposed the privatization of unity schools. Due to its importance for human and state development and the attainment of the MDGs, education attracted extensive financial support from both government and donor agencies, making the education sector one of the critical sectors for civil society budget tracking and monitoring.

Civil society intervention in the budgetary process in Nigeria evolved after a major civil society summit on budget monitoring in 2001, which was supported by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) in collaboration with Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC), Socio-Economic Rights Initiatives (SERI), Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP) and Justice, Development and Peace Commission (JDPC). This meeting created an entry point for the international donor community to become involved in Nigeria's budgetary process. The USAID Promoting Stakeholders' Participation in Economic Transition (PROSPECT) program facilitated the formation of the Budget Transparency Network (BTN), which included involvement by USAID ADVANCE.

It is vital to note that USAID ADVANCE played a role in the socio-economic reform programs in Nigeria within the year under review, including activities in 2006 of ADVANCE subgrantee CISLAC that were key to the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill. The NEITI and Public Procurement bills were also bills enacted with support of ADVANCE and other donor agencies, though these bills have yet to be implemented.

The above three reform areas serve as a window into the dimensions of the political and social environment of Nigeria between 2005 and 2008. In conducting this midterm evaluation of the USAID ADVANCE program, the evaluation team collected feedback from the field which reveals that CSOs are profoundly concerned about the overall direction of the present Yara'dua regime. For most civil society activists, this administration appears

to lack direction in terms of either sustaining the reforms of the previous regime or coming up with its own approach. Among activists' major concerns are the failure to enact the FOI bill and the inability - or unwillingness - to implement NEITI and other Acts that have been passed by the National Assembly. More important, the perceived collapse of the war on graft has made CSOs lose confidence in the present regime. Still, there remain great opportunities for civil society involvement and genuine engagement with the government in fostering democratic governance in Nigeria. The government's perception of civil society organizations, and particularly of NGOs that provide services and implement programs for international donors and institutions, is still one of contention and suspicion, coupled with feelings that these organizations are propaganda tools for the donor community. CSOs have to work both individually and in a group effort toward assuaging these concerns by increasing productive partnerships with the government and conducting their activities in a constructive and transparent manner.

### **THE ADVANCE PROGRAM**

The ADVANCE program contributes to USAID CSP 2004-2009 Strategic Objective (SO) 11: Strengthened Foundations for Democratic Governance. It has been implemented over a four-year period (to be completed in May 2010) and has overlapped with and been involved in many of the major political, socio-economic and state reform events outlined above. By working with civil society to affect demand-side approaches to improve democratic governance, the program is expected to contribute to measurable improvements in transparency and accountability, good governance, access to information, budget transparency and increased rule of law. It was anticipated that these broad improvements in governance would also have an effect on sector-specific change, bringing about policy reform in areas such as education, health, and economic development. The three outcome areas are delineated into training, technical assistance and subgrants for strengthening civil society institutional capacity, increasing CSO capacity for effective advocacy, and strengthening CSO/GON partnerships to fight corruption.

### **Strengthening CSO Institutional Capacity**

The ADVANCE program has largely focused on enhancing CSO institutional capacity by supporting each partner organization's ability to program and manage resources more effectively and efficiently. However, the evaluation team felt that the institutional capacity agenda and activities have focused too much on those administrative, financial and management skills needed to successfully implement a USAID subgrant. Instead, the program should provide a more robust curriculum that would support improvements in key operational areas, with targeted programming being implemented as activities under the other two outcome areas. Those implementing partners interviewed lauded Pact/Nigeria's ability to augment their skill sets in an effective format which includes a strong mentoring component. However, none discussed other aspects of institutional capacity building, some of which were outlined in the original cooperative agreement, which would serve to strengthen CSOs' capacity to effectively support Outcomes 2 and 3. These might include areas such as leadership development, strategic management of CSOs, developing partnerships intra- and cross-sectorally, board development, and constituency-building.

### **Increased CSO Capacity for Effective Advocacy**

Under Outcome 2, the ADVANCE program has supported CSOs and their networks and coalitions to develop and hone their advocacy skills. ADVANCE advocacy skill development has provided technical and financial support to national and subnational activities in three areas: advocacy for the passage of policy reforms and/or monitoring their implementation; understanding, tracking and advocating for improvement in government funding processes; and to a lesser degree, in earlier stages of program implementation, oversight and review of judicial independence. These three accountability and transparency issues outlined in the original program design continue to be the central focus of ADVANCE programmatic activity. During the in-country portion of the midterm evaluation, the evaluation team had the opportunity to attend a multiday advocacy Kaduna training to observe the training format and content, and in subsequent days to follow up with participants on their impressions of the training. The evaluation team's observations matched participant comments in their positive impression of the ADVANCE staff members (and NGO guest trainers) and of the content and process of training. The challenge for the remaining implementation period is for Pact/Nigeria and its more mature partners to modify those training programs for new audiences, including both national and subnational GON institutions and with a wider swath of the Nigerian civil society community.

### **Strengthened Civil Society and Government of Nigeria partnerships to fight corruption**

The ADVANCE program has also worked to develop CSO-GON linkages in order to improve transparency and accountable governance. ADVANCE has provided subgrants and technical support to CSOs for activities focused on engaging public agencies to address policy, electoral, and budgetary issues, among others. The GON change in regime from Obasanjo to Yara'dua, which has overlapped with the implementation timeline of ADVANCE, has complicated the environment for CSO-GON partnerships to develop. This situation has left ADVANCE partners with the complex challenge of developing new relationships with policy makers while tailoring their advocacy efforts to fit new individual and institutional agendas. ADVANCE support of GON-CSO partnerships on the state level has faced a mixed bag of challenges, successes and opportunities. Those ADVANCE program participants interviewed in states such as Cross River cited relatively greater receptiveness among state officials to partnerships aimed at curbing corruption and improving government transparency. One strategy to better develop the CSO-GON partnerships would be to focus on issues of high societal relevance and interest that policymakers feel less threatened addressing, in a way that involves many and varied institutional partners. ADVANCE has followed this approach in the past with its support of the disabled (particularly JONAPWD) during and around the election period and with its support of NGOs working on policy issues and service delivery for HIV/AIDs, and the program should continue this approach.

### **EVALUATION APPROACH**

This midterm evaluation consisted of two general streams of analysis. The evaluation team first conducted a review of secondary source materials that included ADVANCE program progress reports, workplans and other documents; publications generated from

subproject initiatives; USAID Nigeria DG documents; third party assessments of Nigerian civil society; and select applications from subgrantees (see Annex B for a list of documents). The evaluation also included meetings and roundtables across Nigeria over a two-week period (see Annex A for list of key informants interviewed). The evaluation team interviewed approximately 29 different ADVANCE and other democracy and governance stakeholders in Abuja and three other geopolitical areas (Southwest, South-South and Northwest). This included a small nonscientific sample group of six NGOs and networks not working directly with ADVANCE but working on budget transparency, anti-corruption, election related civic education and civil society institutional strengthening issues. While the in-country stage of the evaluation included meetings with a variety of different stakeholders, including GON institutions, bilateral and multilateral donors, international implementing partners and civil society organizations, opportunities for a wider and more balanced engagement of stakeholders were limited by the Nigerian holiday Eid, travel delays and restrictions, and the violence in Jos. The majority of those interviewed were CSOs, networks and coalitions, including some not working directly with ADVANCE program initiatives. The team had less success meeting with government representatives and with other international implementing partners engaged in P/DG and other activities.

The evaluation team was composed of three experts with diverse backgrounds, including an expert from within the Nigerian NGO community, an international civil society expert, and a USAID/Washington Democracy and Governance Fellow. The team's variety of professional backgrounds provided opportunities to guide this inquiry toward meetings with the individuals and organizations best poised to provide insights into ADVANCE activities and Nigeria civil society issues in general. It also provided an opportunity to draw upon comparative program experience of civil society strengthening initiatives, particularly those focused primarily on the public policy and watchdog subsectors.

There were several important strengths and weaknesses embedded in the methodology employed for this evaluation. Strengths of the methodology included the ability to gauge the mood of ADVANCE implementing partners and beneficiaries of the program concerning its value and effectiveness. The Pact staff members were very open to constructive criticism and new ideas, but on the whole they believe that their work has gone well. Encouragingly, the evaluation team did not sense unease on the part of Pact or any tensions between USAID and its implementing partner. Praise for Pact was almost universal among those who had worked with the program and among actors who had knowledge of but had not worked with the program

Criticism was limited and confined to problems within the Publish What You Pay campaign. Although this suggests that the program has generally been well managed, it says little about the effect of the program on the development of Nigerian civil society. What this evaluation can suggest about programming impact is that Pact was in the right place at the right time. Three major reforms—public procurement, fiscal responsibility, and NEITI—were recently passed by the National Assembly with the involvement of civil society, and the ADVANCE program was involved with each one. It is not possible to say what how outcomes might have differed without the program, but Nigerian civil soci-

ety and Pact deserve credit for having the strategic vision to engage these crucial issues where progress was possible. Pact and its partners are also active on issues that have not yet seen the same kind of success, such as freedom of information (FOI).

This methodology does not enable us to determine to what extent the ADVANCE program deserves credit for successful reforms, or whether there were programmatic shortcomings that, if corrected, could have led to even more positive outcomes. The in-country phase of this evaluation spanned only two weeks. The synthesis of information that led to many this report's conclusions and the recommendations outlined here came after conducting stakeholder meetings and roundtables. These evaluation team review sessions were meant to discuss the meetings and come to consensus on salient points. This left no in-country opportunity for follow-up with each stakeholder (with the exception of Pact) to further explore the conclusions.

As with USAID DG programs around the world, convincing answers to questions of program impact require evaluation design, monitoring and information-gathering efforts that were not in place in the case of the ADVANCE program. In response to this global shortcoming, USAID/DCHA/DG has launched an evaluation initiative to help interested missions design new programs in a way that will allow for more rigorous evaluations.

### **ADVANCE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS**

The ADVANCE program recommendations in Sections II through VIII below are based on evaluation team members' consensus about the most important program areas to be strengthened and about the decisions regarding the allocation of resources that need to be made. They are reasonable interventions given the time and resources available to the ADVANCE program and USAID/Nigeria P/DG. The recommendations are also intended to serve as an outline for a civil society strategy for USAID/Nigeria that integrates civil society activities and resources across program areas, builds indigenous institutional capacity, and anticipates tracing the impact of a limited number of ADVANCE initiatives.

These recommendations are summarized as follows:

- Pact should increase its activities to strengthen coalitions and networks (Section II).
- Civil society work should reach below the national level and be integrated at the state and local levels (Section III).
- Civil society work in Nigeria already cuts across USAID sectors, and should be understood and approached in an integrated fashion through a dialogue among USAID partners that leads toward a plan to work cooperatively (Section V).
- Coalitions and networks should connect cross-sectoral civil society work from the bottom up. At the national level, these coalitions, along with particularly

effective individual CSOs, should engage with the legislative and executive branches to influence policy and oversight outcomes (Sections II and V).

- ADVANCE should not focus on electoral reform programming, as it detracts from other activities which are more central to its three core objectives (Section VI);
- USAID/Nigeria P/DG should have a five-year plan for directly funding Nigerian CSOs that begins under the ADVANCE program (Section VII).
- Impact evaluation should begin with new or nascent ADVANCE activities, and support should be sought from USAID/DCHA/DG's new evaluation initiative (Section VIII).

## II. CREATING EFFECTIVE NIGERIAN NETWORKS AND COALITIONS

The ADVANCE program has worked with and provided resources for Nigerian policy change, watchdog and service-providing networks and coalitions including PWYP, the National Procurement Network, the Zero Corruption Coalition and the National Procurement Watch Platform on anticorruption, electoral reform and budget transparency initiatives. While support has included programmatic and institutional capacity development, more can be done to strengthen internal capacity, which could significantly improve performance and efficacy. The typical Nigerian P/DG network or coalition acts more like an individual NGO involved in the programming of its own activities and in pursuit of individual financial interests, rather than providing the broad-based platform needed for members to effectively work together toward a common goal. This evaluation recommends an increase in activities to strengthen these institutions' ability to effectively support and engage their client/member institutions, increase their members, find the proper level of institutionalization to best support their goals, and improve their financial strategies. A critical issue for coalition and network development is to create the type of coordinating process and structure to fit the particular network or coalition, its collaborative aims, and its context. As seen with the recent example of PWYP, a poorly administered network (campaign) can be more difficult to resolve and create larger obstacles to improvement than a single CSO because its constituent parts consist of diverse institutions with varied mandates and constituencies. Networks and coalitions, when successful, enable citizens to amplify their voices and achieve greater influence and impact in enacting and implementing policy, democratic governance and social change. This nexus between ADVANCE partner NGOs and grassroots-level organizing and awareness-raising with individual citizens is largely lacking in ADVANCE program initiatives. Many of the ADVANCE partner networks and coalitions operate in a limited social and operational sphere that has hindered their ability to look for and include diverse institutional partners. This has particularly excluded those service-providing civil society groups and professional organizations that could help increase and expand the scale of their programs and

provide new skills, thereby improving the quality of services and impact of the ADVANCE partners' work.

Civil society networks and coalitions, like individual organizations, find it difficult to achieve their aspirations without sufficient financial resources. This is the case with the Nigerian networks and coalitions interviewed. Yet external funding, such as that which networks and coalitions usually pursue, provides little to strengthen the institution as a whole and usually serves as a weak kind of “glue” for the network or coalition. ADVANCE should work with coalitions and networks to look for funding strategies that build cohesiveness around the central goal. Instituting membership dues and applying for funding in collaboration with member institutions are two such strategies.

Some networks begin with informal cooperation among groups of organizations and then evolve into more formal institutions. Others begin as formal network institutions. Institutionalization can bring valuable assets to a network, such as enhanced legitimacy, a legal identity, more effective coordination and the capacity to receive grants directly. Yet there are several drawbacks. It is not uncommon for the process of institutionalization to change the quality of the network experience for its members. Some active members may lament the change, see an increase in competition for status and funding, and even drop out because they valued a more informal and spontaneous network. New formal positions can create incentives for internal competition and weaken collaborative relationships. Administrative aspects of formal institutions, such as meetings, record-keeping, and financial management, can balloon to the extent that the network comes to feel like a bureaucracy and stifles the very initiative it needs to make it effective. While continuing to work with formal networks and coalitions, ADVANCE should look for opportunities to support ad hoc, informal and temporary coalitions and networks. Finally, developing effective networks and coalitions with more broad-based support can strengthen the perceived legitimacy of civil society among Nigerian policy makers and other GON employees, many of whom are skeptical about the role and activities of civil society in Nigeria.

ADVANCE should develop a training support agenda for partner networks and coalitions to improve:

- Linkages that facilitate communication and learning among groups and organizations with similar programs.
- Platforms to coordinate the programs, activities and resources of multiple groups and organizations to achieve shared policy or program goals.
- Legitimacy, with government and donors as accountable (especially to the Nigerian people), cost-effective vehicles for implementing social development policies and programs that reach the poorest, most isolated or marginalized communities.
- Jointly governed bodies for managing coordinated program implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

One problem with civil society work in Nigeria is that while coalitions and networks look good on paper, with impressive member lists which include diverse organizations, they do not adequately capture the combined strength of their membership. Instead, the secretariat is more likely to behave as if it represents a single NGO rather than a coordinating body. The secretariat can claim to speak and act on behalf of the entire membership, but the real coordination is scant and the impact therefore diminished.

Coalitions need to better reflect the diverse ideas, concerns and perspectives of their members. This can be promoted by working both with secretariats at the national level and with member organizations at all levels—especially subnational. Pact has considerable global experience building coalitions and should be able to bring that experience to bear in the Nigerian context. In theory, this will make its work more effective and even more relevant to Nigerian citizens.

### **III. PROMOTING SUBNATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES**

Citizen participation in state-level planning can improve local authorities' ability to respond to the needs of the community and allows for better targeting of resources based on the articulated needs and priorities of the population, which can lead to more efficient use of resources. Creating channels and conditions for citizens to exercise voice and to demand accountability can also lead to greater transparency in local government affairs. ADVANCE has supported varied transparency and anticorruption activities on the subnational level and should increase these activities in the last year of implementation. ADVANCE state-level activities should be integrated and coordinated with any new USAID local governance initiatives. State and local governments operate a joint account. It is therefore paramount that any USAID local governance initiatives working on budget transparency issues must also coordinate activities with budget transparency initiatives on the state level. Attention should also be paid in complimenting other donor efforts (e.g. EU-INSIDE program; UNDP).

When planning subnational work, a variety of locations throughout the country should be considered. Pact's representatives viewed Lagos and Baylesa as potential states for increasing subnational work because of their perceived higher level of political will. Since this work is feasible throughout Nigeria, USAID's P/DG civil society program is in a position to react to mission-wide strategic decisions regarding geographic focus. It is most important that the civil society program promote the vertical linkages from Abuja down to the states and below. In the future, the geographic scope of the work should be expanded if the model proves to be effective.

### **IV. FOCUSING NATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES**

As subnational level activities under ADVANCE increase, national level initiatives must necessarily decrease. ADVANCE program staff members will have to increase time spent on travel and logistics for oversight of program partners' activities outside of Abuja. If these subnational initiatives incorporate the dual and complementing recommendations of (a) increasing training and mentoring for networks and coalitions, and (b) channeling

network and coalition work vertically to connect with state-level actors—including those working in other USAID/Nigeria program areas—then an increased effort will be needed.

National level initiatives should therefore be more targeted and should focus on those initiatives where program partners can develop a clear plan of action. ADVANCE national level program initiatives include advocacy for new legislation or monitoring the implementation of recently passed laws. Despite the passage of key anticorruption and transparency legislation during the early period of ADVANCE, successes have stalled under the new administration. Both program partners (including CISLAC and IPC) and other non-ADVANCE partner NGOs (such as CLEEN) expressed difficulty understanding legislative dynamics under the Yara’dua government. The FOI bill is a case in point. Pact pointed out in discussions that in the year that FOI passed, civil society had “more money and less hostile legislators,” and “now it’s the opposite.” Given this lack of clarity on advocacy strategies, national level work should focus on monitoring the implementation of recently passed laws (e.g., NEITI, Fiscal Responsibility).

## **V. PROMOTING SYNERGIES ACROSS USAID PROGRAM AREAS**

There are diverse and vibrant programs to engage civil society throughout the Mission. Every CSO works with civil society in its own way, and each approach brings something useful to the table. Benefits of working with P/DG organizations come from the specific political skills and knowledge of government oversight and policy advocacy they contribute. The other sectors bring deep knowledge and commitment to the issues that matter most in the daily lives of typical Nigerian citizens. There are clear potential benefits to combining deep knowledge of pressing concerns with political skill. On the P/DG side, much of this collaboration could fit under the anticorruption umbrella.

This kind of combined effort already exists, but there is great potential for more. One example is budget monitoring by civil society at the state and local level. The Justice and Peace Commission (JDPC) in Lagos State, a beneficiary of Pact training, works with the AIDS Alliance on state and local health budgets. Within this partnership, JDPC brings the budget monitoring skills it gained through training in the Pact program, while the AIDS Alliance contributes specialized knowledge of the health sector.

Each sector presents opportunities for the development of such synergies, which are briefly discussed below. However, there are also impediments to collaboration, and decisions about where to begin can only be made after serious discussions between the P/DG team and the other teams take place. Discussions will also have to include Pact and other USAID partners, as this approach may well bring together organizations that do not have history of working together.

### **EDUCATION**

Initial discussions about building synergies with the Education Team were encouraging. The Education Team has a long-standing and sophisticated civil society program. They

work with community-based organizations in three states: Lagos, Kano and Akwa Ibom. The program works with groups to establish internal systems such as finances (bank accounts), strategic planning (one and five year), and governance structures. In addition, there is a small grants component, and CBOs can benefit from participating in the process of applying for grants from USAID even if they do not initially win. The Education program also includes an impressive effort working with government in Kano state to publish an education accounts report.

Given the broad engagement of USAID, from the community level through state government, there are numerous opportunities to enhance oversight and advocacy in the area of education. For example, community groups could be plugged into larger coalitions to amplify their voices, and the education accounts report is a powerful tool to hold government accountable and to give credit where it is doing well. Adding the political know-how of the P/DG approach to the impressive work being done in education has the potential to improve both education and democratic governance outcomes.

## **HEALTH**

The opportunities for collaboration with the Health Team may be even greater, given the combined size and scope of the Mission's health program. There is clearly room for greater advocacy on the part of the Mission's health partners in civil society. To illustrate, consider HIV-positive Nigerians who depend on the availability of medication: their lives depend on good governance and stability, which well-funded donors and NGOs cannot guarantee. As a group, therefore, HIV-positive Nigerians and those that care for them have the potential to be incredibly effective advocates and watchdogs. Again, adding the political edge of the DG approach has the potential to improve both health and democratic governance outcomes. However, the size and scope of the health program increases the bureaucratic challenge of a combined effort. Therefore, this should be a longer term goal.

## **ECONOMIC GROWTH**

The EG and P/DG teams already work together, and P/DG partner NDI has worked with the EG REFORMS program. There is no earmark for the REFORMS program, however, which will come to an end in June. EG is increasingly facing the challenges posed by earmarks, which limit flexibility in programming. Even within the constraints imposed by earmarks, there are still opportunities to combine the strengths of the P/DG and EG teams toward mutually beneficial ends. For example, the EG program already includes extensive work with civil society, including commodity associations (rice), marketing and producer associations (cassava, fertilizer), input dealers associations, buyers and producers associations (such as rice, maize, cassava, cashew, cocoa), road transport workers associations, and transport owners associations. EG organizes these associations where they exist by providing help with self-governance and technical capacity to carry out their mandates. Given this impressive base upon which to build, it should be possible to find issues for advocacy and oversight that fit well within the EG earmarks of agriculture and trade.

## **CONNECTING CROSS SECTORAL CIVIL SOCIETY EFFORTS TO POLICY**

This is the step that brings all the pieces together to a coherent and focused point. Cross-sectoral work with CBOs and CSOs should be linked to strengthened coalitions. The coalitions can link sub-national civil society to national policy debates. These coalitions, along with particularly effective individual CSOs, should engage with the executive and legislative branches to influence policy development and implementation outcomes through advocacy and oversight. A unifying theme might be budget monitoring toward a general anticorruption goal.

Because of its work with executive branch institutions, Pact is well situated to promote and coordinate executive branch engagement with civil society. On the legislative branch side, USAID has the opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of Pact and NDI by encouraging them to work together. NDI gives subgrants to CSOs in order to link civil society to their work with the National Assembly. NDI works with 15 committees—eight in the House and seven in the Senate—that deal with health, education, poverty, national planning, women's affairs, youth, agriculture, and perhaps more. Given the wide range of issues covered by the NDI program, any cross-sectoral links created within the Mission should be relevant to NDI's National Assembly program. The role for NDI as part of USAID's more integrated strategic approach would be to focus the contact between civil society and the National Assembly with the goal of influencing policy and oversight outcomes. At this time though, NDI works with CSOs that lack consistent, effective connections to organizations and communities at the sub-national level. Linking NDI's National Assembly work to Pact would add new cross-sectoral and sub-national dimensions to USAID's work on policy and oversight at the national level.

NDI and Pact have successfully collaborated on other activities under ADVANCE including with coordination around electoral reform activities such as CSO election town hall meetings. Both NDI and Pact also collaborated through joint and complementary support to Nigerian institutions such as the PPDC-founded National Procurement Watch Platform (NPWP), which NDI worked with on the development of an advocacy plan on how to engage the National Assembly on the proposed and unwelcome amendments to the 2007 Public Procurement Act.

## **SYNERGIES WITH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DONORS**

Opportunities for synergies with other bilateral and multilateral donors also exist. The evaluation team met with both the European Union delegation and the UNDP. The former provides two streams of funding support that are similar to ADVANCE programming and/or work with mutual stakeholders in Nigeria. The European Development Fund (EDF) has provided support to the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and support for elections. It has also provided assistance under a Support to Reforming Institutions Program (SRIP), which aids the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) activities as well as corresponding efforts at the state and local levels (SEEDS and LEEDS, respectively). The EDF also supports micro-development projects in nine Niger Delta States that work to strengthen participatory and gender equitable local development governance. The second and more nascent stream of

funding support derives from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) through which the European Commission provides opportunities for Nigerian CSOs to apply for funding in four thematic areas. The EIDHR INSIDE (Increasing Non-State Actors) program is currently in its conceptual phase, with the first work plan scheduled to begin early in 2009, and focuses on training and capacity-building of CSOs. Beyond training and capacity-building, INSIDE will include a mentoring program and a grant component that will make up 60 percent of the expected 20 million Euros for the multiyear program.

While the UNDP has worked with the same Nigerian NGOs (e.g. CISLAC, ACE, BTNC) as has the ADVANCE program, it, like the EU, also has not worked directly with it. The UNDP also works in the area of budget tracking, which in its opinion is one of the most important areas for civil society to work on. The UNDP's current and future programming is on a smaller scale where it provides financial support the training of NGOs on the Public Procurement Act. As the UNDP has moved into its 7th Country Program in January, it had planned to increase their work in 13 states on the local level with local councils.

## **VI. ELECTORAL REFORM WORK**

The stream of activities in the area of electoral reform—while not contemplated in the original ADVANCE work plan—did enable ADVANCE to expand its Nigerian partners by providing opportunities to work with Muslim NGOs and coalitions in the Northern geopolitical area. These and other developed relationships should continue to be built on with anticorruption, electoral reform, budget advocacy, and network and coalition strengthening activities in mind. ADVANCE should also facilitate dialogue and activities between these Nigerian partners and the other international implementing partners focused on election activities. ADVANCE programming, however, should not include any additional electoral reform work. While Pact cited the merits of ADVANCE's electoral reform work, other program partners saw the channeling of ADVANCE resources to election-related activities as diverting needed financial resources away from core programming and sidelining existing program partners that lacked electoral reform experience.

## **VII. STRENGTHENING CSO CAPACITY FOR DIRECT FUNDING**

There is a strong desire by many ADVANCE program partners to see donor assistance channeled directly to indigenous nongovernmental organizations, networks, coalitions and intermediate service organizations. This approach is often times taken as a way to centralize indigenous institutions' role in strategic decision making and their leadership of activities, in order to maximize the use of limited USAID funding and increase local ownership of projects. The direct funding of Nigerian CSOs by USAID presently occurs within other technical areas outside of P/DG, although it has occurred within P/DG in the past (under the USAID/OTI model utilized in 1998-1999). USAID should look toward

learning how other implementing partners have been working to build this capacity in the Nigerian NGOs that they work with. The health sector provides a potentially useful model for P/DG team to follow. The Leadership Management Sustainability (LMS) program has the specific goal of preparing host country organizations to compete directly for USAID funding. In the beginning, there were two simple goals: (1) to improve CSOs' ability to write proposals and (2) to prepare organizations specifically to pass the USG pre-award audit. The second has proved to be the most difficult part; in the experience of LMS in Nigeria, none of the potential organizations had systems capable of meeting USG standards. Over time, however, the program has succeeded in preparing Nigerian organizations to win USAID contracts. Management Sciences for Health (MSH) has held this global grant for 15 years.

USAID should use caution in providing this type of direct funding in Nigeria in general and with the particular subsector of Nigerian public policy and watchdog NGOs involved with the ADVANCE program. Rivalries exist within and among CSOs and program partners frequently cited "big fish" organizations as dominating the program agenda. Circumventing such rivalries has been one additional benefit of having an international NGO serve as an intermediary and facilitator of civil society capacity building work. Care should be taken to implement this initiative in a manner which does not stoke disagreements within civil society to a point where competition becomes counterproductive. The scope of the current evaluation did not permit an assessment of the readiness of the Nigerian institutions to receive direct funding for program implementation or to serve as intermediary service organizations charged with responsibility for distributing grants. An assessment of that type would take considerable time and would require, among other things, an ongoing review of each organization's financial, management and administrative procedures. The evaluation team recommends that USAID/Nigeria P/DG develop a five-year plan for moving toward directly funding Nigerian P/DG CSOs. ADVANCE should help with the beginning phase of this process by first learning from other USG and other implementing partners about the approaches to preparing Nigerian institutions to receive direct funding and then establish a process with established benchmarks under which Nigerian CSOs working in P/DG program can be identified, supported and monitored.

## **VIII. MEASURING PROGRAM IMPACT**

USAID should consider more rigorous evaluation methods for future civil society programs, including a possible impact evaluation that would ideally be planned as part of the initial program design. The mission could request support from the USAID/DCHA/DG evaluation initiative, which is available to help missions design new programs in a way that will allow for more rigorous evaluations that more effectively measure program impact.

## IX. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

In the RFTOP, USAID posed the following specific questions. Some of these questions have been addressed at least in part in the sections above.

### **QUESTION 1: WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BY ADVANCE IN ACHIEVING THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES SPECIFIED IN THE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT AND THE AMENDMENTS?**

All ADVANCE activities funded under the award were to be coordinated under a single work plan and will explicitly build on the activities of the P/DG portfolio under the Transition Strategy (1999 - 2003), the P/DG strategy under the new CSP (2004 - 2009) as well as the other Mission Strategic Objectives (SOs). Below is an outline of this progress (by objective) in achieving the CA goals and objectives.

Objective 1: Strengthened civil society organization (CSO) capacity for effective program and financial management

Pact's approach and efforts with partner subgrantees have performed strongly under this objective in supporting areas of institutional development that support the implementation of subprojects. A broader view and training/mentoring agenda focused on constituency identification, monitoring and outreach would deepen the achievements made under this objective.

Objective 2: Increased CSO capacity for effective advocacy for key policy reforms such as budget transparency, access to information, and judicial oversight

ADVANCE and its partners worked on three key laws that were passed: NEITI, Fiscal Responsibility, and Public Procurement. However, ADVANCE also worked on the FOI, which has been a discouraging process. It is difficult to find the exact set of dynamics that establish a direct causal link between civil society advocacy activities and the passage of a bill and thus to assess the impact of ADVANCE's efforts in this regard.

Objective 3: Strengthened public-private (CSO) partnerships to fight corruption through public oversight agencies and initiatives

ADVANCE was able to work effectively with the 2005-2007 legislature, but much less so since the new legislature convened in June 2007. Program stakeholders that were interviewed cited a lack of understanding of or interest in these issues by the newly elected legislators and their own inability to gauge the position of the Yara'dua government on transparency and anticorruption bills and policies. The evaluation team cannot comment on any progress on partnerships between civil society and all executive branch institutions (ICPC, EFCC, NEITI) that ADVANCE works with, as it was unsuccessful in obtaining interviews with these bodies. The evaluation team, however, did meet with Professor Sylvester Monye, Executive Secretary of the Nigerian Planning Commission, who said that "CSOs in Nigeria are nothing more than propaganda tools for donors because they fund them." This is a long established attitude within government. In 1987, the first

Nigerian human rights group was established during a time of military rule. This new group challenged the military in the street, in court, and internationally. The Vice President at that time and other government officials since then shared Professor Monye's sentiment about civil society serving to further the agenda of donors. But, while certainly of concern, this view is not shared throughout the government. For example, Dr. Lanre Adebayo of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) said that he works closely with donors and sees a very positive role for civil society in Nigeria.

**QUESTION 2: ARE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ADVANCE ACTIVITIES STILL VALID DRAWING FROM THE DG STRATEGY, OTHER P/DG MISSION PROGRAMS AND EMERGING POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE COUNTRY?**

The objectives of ADVANCE activities are still valid and hold a central importance in strengthening the foundations of democratic governance in Nigeria.

**QUESTION 3: EVALUATE THE PROPORTION OF NATIONAL VERSUS STATE ACTIVITIES VIS-À-VIS THE OBJECTIVES OF ADVANCE, BEARING IN MIND RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE MISSION'S DG STRATEGY.**

National level activities should be scaled back and refocused on consolidating successes by monitoring the implementation of laws. The advent of the Yara'dua regime has changed much in the political landscape and perceptions of CSO roles and opportunities (or lack thereof) to effectively engage with national level GON policy-making and implementing institutions. Looking for opportunities to increase state-level activities should be a focus during this last year of program implementation.

**QUESTION 4: DETERMINE ACTIVITIES IN THE AWARD NOT IMPLEMENTED BY ADVANCE AND IF SUCH ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.**

With regard to its institutional capacity building training, ADVANCE should focus more on developing a training and mentoring plan for networks and coalitions on both the national and subnational levels, reorienting some of the training workshops outlined in its award agreement (e.g., leadership training, strategic management, partnership development and resource mobilization—see page 10 of the cooperative agreement) for the distinct needs of this group. ADVANCE should continue to work with current networks and coalition partners (ZCC, PWYP, MULAC, WANGONET) and expand this pool only when there is an opportunity to connect national level advocacy activities downward to state and local level and/or when this can be done through a cross-sectoral initiative with other USAID implementing partners.

**QUESTION 5: DETERMINE WHETHER ADVANCE IS WORKING WITH THE APPROPRIATE ORGANIZATIONS TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.**

This evaluation has had limited opportunity to compare and contrast those Nigerian organizations working with ADVANCE funding and within its programming with those who are not. It has not been able to assess the wider landscape of civil society organizations to provide anything but a determination of limited depth. With that caveat, a majority of ADVANCE direct partners are organizations, networks and coalitions whose central

institutional mission is line with the program objectives. In this sense they are the appropriate subsector of civil society to work with for implementing a program aimed at demand-side strengthening of democratic governance by increasing government transparency, rule of law, curbing corruption and electoral reform. The challenge is to connect those public policy and watchdog subsector institutions meaningfully to constituencies (usually service delivery NGOs in a technical sector like workforce development, education, health, etc.) which provide a link to the every-day issues facing Nigerians. What has been missing is the vertical connection from national level advocacy to state-level concerns and actors that would help to increase the number of Nigerian institutions and individuals involved in and knowledgeable about ADVANCE goals and activities. Missing too are horizontal connections between the current ADVANCE implementing partners and other civil society actors such as trade unions, religious institutions and professional associations, many of which are concerned with and benefit from the reforms promoted under ADVANCE. The development of these vertical and horizontal connections has been an oversight in ADVANCE programming, one which ADVANCE should seek to address in its work with networks and coalitions.

**QUESTION 6: DETERMINE WHETHER COMMUNICATIONS AND RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA PARTNER AGENCIES HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING RESULTS.**

There is still a high level of suspicion among government agencies as illustrated by the evaluation team's meeting with the Nigerian National Planning Commission, the institution charged with GON oversight of international donor and Nigerian NGO activities. The evaluation team did not have an opportunity to interview many of the GON partner institutions, but believes from its meetings with CSOs, the NPC, NOA and multilateral institutions that CSOs generally must display a higher level of professionalism and demonstrate their legitimacy in order to improve their relationship with the government. The GON has a limited understanding of civil society, that these institutions represent Nigerian constituencies (which ultimately represent voting blocks) and how to work with those CSOs. There do exist institutionalized mechanisms for civil society input. The National Assembly has a CSO liaison office, for example; the ADVANCE program should seek opportunities to interact with that office.

**QUESTION 7: IS PACT'S PARTNERSHIP WITH ACTIONAID ACHIEVING THE STIPULATED RESULTS?**

Through an ADVANCE grant covering February 2006-January 2010, ActionAid continues to implement a CSO Budget Monitoring and Advocacy Project to build the capacity of key civil society organizations to participate effectively in national and state-level budget processes. ActionAid was involved in demand-side budget transparency work before its initiation of this project under ADVANCE.

This project has included strengthening the capacity of CSO partners to access, analyze, and use budget information to advocate for priority issues; increasing budget advocacy and monitoring of budget performance on specific social services and other sectors such as agriculture and economic development; and increasing the capacity of the media for

effective reporting on the budget process. ActionAid brings added value to ADVANCE both from its past budget advocacy programming and understanding of budget tracking in Nigeria, and in its ability to source competent trainers to support ADVANCE budget advocacy trainings.

**QUESTION 8: HOW CAN ADVANCE HELP STRENGTHEN THE PUBLISH WHAT YOU PAY CAMPAIGN (PWYP) IN NIGERIA TO IMPLEMENT EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI) ACTIVITIES USING THE AUDIT REPORT OF PWYP/NIGERIA FUNDED BY PACT/ADVANCE?**

ADVANCE has taken a careful approach to working with PWYP since its Secretariat has run into issues leading to a loss of confidence among donors and members. Since then ADVANCE has provided targeted financial support (e.g. for the Annual General Meeting).

While the newly adopted PWYP governance structure is excessively layered, ADVANCE should work closely with the newly elected Chairperson and the PWYP staff, the six members of the executive board, and the NGO members of the general assembly. Organizational development support for the board should also be included. ADVANCE should also work with PWYP to grow and diversify the members of the general assembly.

**QUESTION 9: WHAT ARE THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES (IF ANY) AND/OR EFFECTS OF ADVANCE, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE?**

The redirecting of funds to support election activities diverted support from some partner NGOs and increased the number of ADVANCE partners from what was originally intended. Partner NGOs perceived this as having diluted their efforts. It also decreased the financial resources available in year five. On the other hand, these activities built relationships with Muslim NGOs and coalitions, opening up avenues of institutional strengthening support to institutions that serve a needy and often difficult to reach population.

**QUESTION 10: WHAT ARE THE SYNERGIES ESTABLISHED (OR NOT) WITH OTHER P/DG AND MISSION ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS POTENTIAL AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT?**

The limited synergies that have occurred have been among P/DG implementing partners, particularly synergies with IRI in coordinating activities and co-supporting Nigerian partners (e.g. JONPWAD) around election reform activities. Other USAID/Nigeria (non-P/DG) program areas have robust activities working with CSOs on the same anticorruption and budget advocacy issues as ADVANCE. Synergies with these implementing partners and Nigerian NGOs have not been established.

**QUESTION 11: WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED? LESSONS LEARNED SHOULD COVER IMPLEMENTATION, MANAGEMENT APPROACHES AS WELL AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH PARTNERS AND SUBGRANTEES AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS.**

There is a general consensus among program stakeholders that more must be done to reach out to and connect with citizens at the local level, in a manner that links the issues that ADVANCE focuses on to the every-day concerns of Nigerians. ADVANCE anticorruption and budget advocacy activities are not easily understandable to all, and better ways must be developed to communicate and connect ADVANCE work to larger groups of the Nigerian population in order to improve advocacy efforts and success. ADVANCE has engaged media-focused NGOs (e.g. IPC), particularly on increasing journalists' understanding of and ability to cover anticorruption, and built the capacity of media professionals to enable them to report more effectively on issues of public finance analysis, transparency and accountability and expenditure of public funds.

**QUESTION 12: WHAT SHOULD BE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2009 -2010 ADVANCE PROGRAMMING/IMPLEMENTATION?**

As outlined above in Sections II to VIII and summarized here, programmatic recommendations for the remaining 14 month period include:

- Pact should increase its activities to strengthen coalitions and networks (Section II).
- Civil society work should reach further down and be integrated at the state and local levels (Section III).
- Civil society work in Nigeria already cuts across USAID sectors and should be understood and approached in an integrated fashion, through a dialogue among USAID partners that leads toward a plan to work cooperatively (Section V).
- Coalitions and networks should connect cross sectoral civil society work from the bottom up. At the national level, these coalitions, along with particularly effective individual CSOs, should engage with the legislative and executive branches to influence policy and oversight outcomes (Section II and V).
- ADVANCE should not focus on electoral reform programming, as it detracts from other activities which are more central to its three core objectives(Section VI);
- USAID/Nigeria P/DG should have a five year goal of directly funding Nigerian CSOs that begins under ADVANCE (Section VII).

- Impact evaluation should begin small with new or nascent ADVANCE activities, and support should be sought from USAID/DCHA/DG's new evaluation initiative (Section VIII).

**QUESTION 13: WHAT SPECIFIC CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION WILL ENSURE THAT RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED AND MAXIMIZE IMPACT?**

The evaluation team recommends no changes in the management of the ADVANCE program. Although ADVANCE has had considerable turnover in its senior and technical management in its almost four years of implementation (as is apt to occur within a five-year implementation timeline), Pact has recruited and retained strong development professionals who have been largely successful as program and technical managers and implementers. Interviews with program stakeholders and ADVANCE staff members suggest that the current ADVANCE staff is professional, qualified and collaborates well with stakeholders and the client. It understands well the issues, needs and challenges of ADVANCE objectives.

## ANNEX A: Key Informants Interviewed

Nigerian Nongovernmental Organizations					
<i>Name/title</i>	<i>Institution</i>	<i>Institution Description</i>	<i>Role in ADVANCE Program</i>	<i>Nigerian State</i>	<i>Beginning Date of Engagement with the ADVANCE program</i>
Mohammed A. Farouk/Executive Director	AIDS Alliance Nigeria	AAN is a national nonprofit, nonreligious and nongovernmental organization formed by a group of PLWHA in December 1999. It is a membership organization open to PLWHA and people affected by Aids (PABA)	Implementation of ADVANCE project on Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations in HIV Budget Tracking and Improving Transparency in Resources Allocation for Effective Service Delivery in the Prevention and Treatment of HIV in Lagos state.	Lagos	May 01, 2007
Abdullahi Muhammad Sufy (Programme Director)	Interfaith Mediation Centre	IMC is a nonprofit, service provider on faith based peace building, mediation, conflict management mitigation, resolution and transformation with special focus on militant religious youth, women and senior religious leaders. IMC was founded by two directors; an Imam who is a devote Muslim and a Pastor also an ardent Christian who were arch enemies but brought together in the quest for peace in the troubled parts of the country.	ADVANCE has been working the Interfaith Mediation Centre to strengthen its internal capacity and ability to strategically and administratively manage programs	Kaduna	November 24, 2008

<p>Dr. Otive Igbuzor (Country Director), and Olutayo Olujide (HR/OD Manager)</p>	<p>ActionAid International, Nigeria (AAIN), Abuja</p>	<p>The AAIN program commenced operations in January 2000 with the establishment of its country office in Abuja. Initial work started in two thematic areas Reproduction Sexual Health and Rights (HIV/AIDS), Education, Conflict Resolution, Peace Building and Emergencies, and the integrated Partnerships against Poverty which commenced in 2003, building on the experiences and lessons learnt from the initial work where appropriate, creating linkages with existing thematic areas. Promoting Good Governance, Gender &amp; Women's Rights are cross-cutting themes which apply across the whole program but also have stand alone initiatives</p>	<p>ADVANCE project aimed at advocating for a more people centred budget regime while also ensuring transparency and accountability in public funds</p>	<p>Abuja</p>	<p>January 26, 2006</p>
<p>Y Z Ya'u (Executive Director)</p>	<p>Center for Information Technology and Development (CITAD), Kano</p>	<p>CITAD is composed of many hardworking men and women dedicated to advancing the use and understanding of ICT in Nigeria to meet development goals</p>	<p>Voter Education project in Kano and Jigawa states</p>	<p>Abuja</p>	<p>February 09, 2007</p>
<p>Prince E. Idiong (Programme Coordinator)</p>	<p>Citizens Rights Awareness Initiative (CRAI), Calabar</p>	<p>CRAI is a nonpartisan, non-profit, nongovernmental organization dedicated to the promotion, awareness and protection of human rights, access to justice and rule of law.</p>	<p>Member of PWYP and FOI coalition, and partner to ABGREMO (ADVANCE subgrantee)</p>	<p>Calabar</p>	<p></p>

Uko Ekott (Programme Manager)	Center for Community Empowerment and Peace Initiative (CEPIN), Calabar	CEPIN's works on empowerment of youth, women/children and communities through advocacy, research, training and microfinance schemes.	Member of PWYP and FOI coalition, and partner to ABGREMO (ADVANCE subgrantee)	Calabar	
Innocent Chukwumah (Executive Director)	Center for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN Foundation), Lagos	CLEEN is nongovernmental organization established in January 1998 with the mission of promoting public safety, security and accessible justice through the strategies of empirical research, legislative advocacy, demonstration programs and publications, in partnership with government and civil society	CLEEN does not participate in ADVANCE programming or initiatives	Lagos	
William Itoror (Programme Manager)	Justice Development and Peace Commission (JDPC), Calabar	JDPC is a nongovernmental organization with a mission to promote sustainable and integrated human development through holistic approach without any form of discrimination against any human being.	Budget tracking, member of PWYP, also partner with ABGREMO	Calabar	
Ekpeyoung Bassey, Program Officer	Akpabuyo Bakassi Green Movement (ABGREMO) currently known as Green Concern for Development, Calabar	ABGREMO for Development is a youth based NGO working for the promotion of environmental and Human rights protection in and around the coastal communities of Niger-Delta, Nigeria through information sharing, education and action programmes.	1. NEITI project, 2. Elections, 3. Legislative advocacy and capacity building for civil society organization on oil revenue transparency in Akwa Ibom and Cross River	Calabar	September 19, 2007

<p>Auwal Rafsanjani (Executive Director) and Boniface Kas-sam (Senior Programme/Media Officer)</p>	<p>Civil Society Legislative and Advocacy Center (CISLAC), Abuja</p>	<p>CISLAC is a nongovernmental, nonprofit legislative advocacy, lobbying, information sharing and research organization.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Office apartment renting.</li> <li>2. Public Procurement</li> <li>3. Fiscal Responsibility</li> <li>4. NEITI</li> <li>5. tracking of targeted bills</li> </ol>	<p>Abuja</p>	<p>March 29, 2006</p>
<p>Lanre Arogundade (Director)</p>	<p>International Press Centre (IPC)</p>	<p>IPC is officially registered through trusteeship, as a not-for-profit, nongovernmental and independent media resource center. Though based in Lagos, its activities extend to the rest of the country and West Africa subregion.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 2007 Election Reporting (production of a Resource Handbook for Nigeria Journalists).</li> <li>2. Anticorruption campaign</li> <li>3. FOI campaign</li> </ol>	<p>Lagos</p>	<p>March 30, 2006</p>
<p>Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim</p>	<p>Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)</p>	<p>The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) was established in the United Kingdom in 1997 out of the need to mobilize global opinion for democratic development, provide an independent space to reflect critically on the challenges posed to the democratization and development process in West Africa and generate dialogue on alternative pathways that are universally relevant and context sensitive.</p>	<p>Policy dialogue on institutionalizing mechanisms to address violence against women in public life</p>	<p>Abuja</p>	<p>March 07, 2006</p>

Nigerian Networks and Coalitions					
Coordinator	Budget Transparency Network and Accountability (BTAN), Calabar	BITAN is a network of about 38 members in Delta, Rivers, and Cross River States. It has offices in virtually all the constituencies of the states, and this has aided in their dissemination of information and advocacy.	Partner with ABGREMO although not directly involved in the implementation of ADVANCE programming	Calabar	
Y.Y. Arrigasiyyu/Executive Director	Muslim League for Accountability (MULAC)	MULAC is a network of Muslim civil society groups	1. Electoral Reform Dialogue 2. Engagement with electoral reform committee	Kaduna	February 01, 2007
David Ugolor (Former Executive Director)	Publish What You Pay	Publish What You Pay Nigeria Campaign is a coalition of over 200 nongovernmental organizations working to ensure transparency and accountability in Nigeria's extractive industry	Publish What you Pay Campaign	Abuja	July 26, 2005
Peter Egbule (Programme Officer)	West Africa Non Governmental Organization Network (WANGONeT), Lagos	The West African NGO Network is an electronic community of civil society organization across the regions that share the singular goal of enhancing the development of their stakeholders within the population of the region in particular, and the world in general. The WANGONeT project was originally conceptualized and designed in substance if not form to harness the global reach of the steadily evolving	WANGONeT – received a subgrant from PACT to do a capacity building training/workshop for 30 NGOs, which is to be done in 2 phases. The 1st phase of the training was on the theme, Capacity Enhancement Training On Oil Revenue Transparency And Civic Oversight Of The NEITI Process For Nigerian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and this was executed October 24 – 26, 2007.	Kaduna	September 19, 2007

		Information and Communications Technology sectors for the benefit of Non Governmental Organizations, media, cultural and educational institutions.	Whereas the 2nd phase was scheduled for November 21 – 23, 2007.		
Ms Hauwa Kazeem (Programme Officer)	Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC), Abuja	The Zero-Corruption Coalition (ZCC) is a network of over 100 civil society organisations campaigning against corruption in Nigeria. The ZCC is a partner in the 'Accountability Nigeria' coalition of public and private organisations working with transparency and accountability in Nigeria. The ZCC does advocacy work with legislators and government anticorruption agencies on the need to domesticate and implement both the UNCAC and the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.	ADVANCE Subgrantee to do work on (i) citizens mandate on ICPC, EFCC, process in Lagos, Calabar, Kano and Enugu States. (ii) Interactive sessions with legislatures (iii) NEITI (production of handbook to engage government and general public) (iv) 'stick to issues' during 2007 elections. (v) Production of citizens guide and NEITI process.	Abuja	June 14, 2006
Government of Nigeria Institutions					
Prof Muonye (Minister in-charge)	National Planning Commission	Decree No.12 of 1992 established the National Planning Commission on 26th March, 1992 and the Explanatory Note to the Decree provides that the Commission was established to, among other things, determine and advise the Government of the Federation on matters relating to	The National Planning Commission is the regulatory and oversight body for international donors and formal civil society conducting activities in Nigeria.	Abuja	

		national development planning and the over-all management of the economy. The Decree was designed to seek the promotion of national consensus, mobilisation and the attainment of self-reliance and sustainable development with social justice.			
International/Bilateral Institutions					
David Omozuafoh (Programme Analyst - Governance)	United Nations Development Programme	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been operating in the Federal Republic of Nigeria since independence in the 1960s, providing the country with relevant technical assistance required for sustainable economic and social development. The legal authority to operate in the country is contained in a Standard Basic Agreement signed between the Government of Nigeria and UNDP.	The UNDP implements DG programming in Nigeria. It currently does not directly work with the ADVANCE program although it and its implementing partner work on parallel issues.	Abuja	
Dauda Garuba (Coordinator)	Revenue Watch Institute (RWI)	The Revenue Watch Institute is a nonprofit policy institute and grant making organization that promotes the responsible management of oil, gas and mineral resources for the public good. With effective revenue management, citizen engagement and real government accountability,	--	Abuja	

		natural resource wealth can drive development and national growth. RWI provides the expertise, funding and technical assistance to help countries realize these benefits.			
Pricilla Ankut (Prg Officer, Good Governance & Institutional Reform); Danladi Plang (Project Officer, Good Governance and Human Rights)	European Union (Delegation of the EC to Nigeria), Abuja	The European Union implements DG programming that includes civil society institutional capacity building. They are currently involved in an internal review process of programs	The EU does not work on the ADVANCE program	Abuja	
Mourtada Deme (Resident Country Director)	International Republican Institute	The International Republican Institute (IRI) has worked to strengthen the political process in Nigeria since 1998. This process includes monitoring the electoral process, enhancing the capacity of political parties and encouraging greater participation of women and youth, as well as forging stronger ties and developing collaborative efforts between political parties and civil society organizations.		Abuja	March 2008

Country Director	International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES)	A key focus of IFES' work in Nigeria has been strengthening the capacity of election administration bodies to help ensure credible elections and strategic planning for election management. Under a program that is funded by USAID (and the United Kingdom's DFID).		Abuja	August 2006
Dan Spealman, Pact Country Representative; John Ikubaje (Program Coordinator: AntiCorruption Advocacy; Ahmed N. Mohammed, (Deputy Country Director)	Pact Nigeria	Pact/Nigeria is the ADVANCE implementing partner		Abuja/Kaduna	
Don Harbick, Country Director	Management Sciences for Health (MSH) LMS Project – Leadership Management Sustainability	The Leadership, Management and Sustainability (LMS) Program supports people and organizations around the world to strengthen the way they lead and manage their own programs to achieve widespread improvements in health.		Abuja	
Siana Tackett	USAID/Nigeria/PEPFAR Team	PEPFAR works with national and local leaders to support integrated prevention, treatment and care programs.		Abuja	
Linda Crawford	USAID/Nigeria LMS Activity Manager	The LMS Program supports people and organizations around the world to strengthen the way they lead and manage their own programs to achieve widespread improvements in health.		Abuja	

Abdukadir Gudugi	USAID/Nigeria Economic Growth Team	<p>CS on the EG side include commodity associations (rice), marketing and producer associations (cassava, fertilizer), input dealers associations, buyers and producers associations (such as rice, maize, cassava, cashew, cocoa), road transport workers associations, transport owners associations.</p> <p>EG organizes these associations where they exist – provides help with self-governance and technical capacity to carry out mandate.</p>		Abuja	
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## **ANNEX B: Compendium of Documents Reviewed**

ADVANCE Cooperative Agreement (620-A-00-05-00096-00)  
ADVANCE Semi-Annual Report-May 23-September, 30 2005  
ADVANCE Quarter II Report, FY 2006 May 24, 2006  
Pact-ADVANCE Stakeholder Evaluation Report 2007  
ADVANCE Voices Newsletter October 2008  
ADVANCE Semi-Annual Report-May 23-September 30 2005  
Pact Nigeria/ADVANCE Program Stakeholder Evaluation and Review Report, Fiscal Year 2007  
Pact Advance Fiscal Year 2009 Work plan (Draft; not yet approved by USAID/Nigeria)  
Pact ADVANCE Annual Work plan FY 2009: October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009  
ADVANCE\_2006 August Performance Data Table  
SO11 PACT Data Collation Sheet Pact FY 06 Annual Report  
Proposed PWYP Two-Year Budget submitted to ADVANCE  
Revised ADVANCE PMP February 15 2006

Nigeria Civil Society Assessment, March 2004 (AEP-I-00-99-00041-00, Task Order 823)  
Report of a One-Day Civil Society Consultative Forum on the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), May 2004  
A Review of Official Development Assistance to Nigeria, 199-2007, National Planning Commission  
Toward A Fiscal Responsibility Regime in Nigeria; The Civil Society Mass Media intervention 2006, © 2006, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)  
The Legislature and the Budget Process in Nigeria, © 2007, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)  
Strengthening Stakeholders' Oversight Roles in the NEITI Process in Nigeria, © 2008, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)  
Election Reporting: A Resource Handbook for Nigerian Journalists, © 2007, International Press Centre (IPC)  
The Gathering Storm of HIV/AIDs in Nigeria: The Story So Far, © 2006, Ebere Ahanihu  
Corruption & Budget Reporting: A Media Audit, © 2007, International Press Centre (IPC)  
The Budget and You, Aids Alliance in Nigeria  
HIV/AIDs: The Disease Burden and the level of Funding in Nigeria, © 2005, Aids Alliance Nigeria  
Citizen's Handbook on ICPC & EFCC: Corruption Makes Us Poor, © 2006, Zero Corruption Coalition (ZCC)  
Identity, Institutions and Democracy in Africa; Afro Barometer Working Paper No. 68, by Peter Lewis 2007  
Civil Society Organizations: Reforming Civil Society, March 2007

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