



SURVEY ON POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY IN AFGHANISTAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

NOVEMBER 2012



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



In December 2011, Democracy International (DI) completed a nationwide survey in Afghanistan that resulted in some of the most comprehensive research to date on democracy, elections, and governance in Afghanistan. This survey was conducted to better understand how citizen's views and attitudes toward elections and political processes affect their participation in the electoral process. The results of this research serve to inform policymakers, especially Afghan decision-makers, about the state of democracy and governance, particularly as the international community prepares for military withdrawal from the country in 2014, which could have a profound effect on the vitality of Afghanistan's democracy. As the 2014 security and political transition approaches, there is increasing uncertainty among both Afghans and the international community as to whether the recently established democratic political institutions will endure. Based on the results of a wide range of research methods, including a nationally representative public opinion survey, innovative survey-based simulations, and semistructured interviews and focus group dis-

cussions, this report examines how Afghans perceive the state of democracy and governance in their country and specifically the processes and institutions that are designed to support the consolidation of democracy in Afghanistan.

This executive summary presents the key findings from the nationwide survey and a summary of the findings from each section of the survey: direction of the country, economic conditions, changes in the past year, satisfaction with democracy, role of state and other important actors in society, models of governance, Taliban, fighting and political stability, political institutions, engagement with elections, constituent relations with individual members of the national assembly, political parties, local politics, land and conflict, and findings from survey based simulations. This executive summary also provides a selection of results from the nationwide public opinion survey, included as Appendix A.

METHODOLOGY

DI conducted a nationally representative public opinion survey on political attitudes, extensive semistructured interviews, and focus group discussions. In the nationwide public opinion survey, a total of 8,620 face-to-face survey interviews were conducted in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. The national sample of 6,000 respondents was supplemented by an additional 400 respondents in each of the following districts: Ghazni Center District, (Ghazni Province), Bazarak District (Panjsher Province), Arghandab District (Kandahar Province), Dehdadi District (Balkh Province), and Kabul Municipality. The oversampling allowed DI to attain a representative sample in these districts as the nationwide survey is only fully representative at the provincial level. DI collected qualitative data, consisting of interviews and focus group discussions, in three of these districts (described below) to get a better understanding of the trends in the quantitative survey. In each province, approximately 10% of the allocated sample size was oversampled to allow for the elimination of interviews that exceed the norm of patterned response for the survey. A total of 10,510 interviews were attempted, with a total of 8,620 interviews actually conducted. The survey, including the oversample, has a margin of error of approximately $\pm 1\%$.

As part of the nationwide survey, DI embedded two survey simulations, each on an important issue related to democracy and governance. The first simulation explores how changes in electoral rules to the Wolesi Jirga might affect who gets elected to this body, as well as voter attitudes regarding support for democracy and elections. The second simulation explores how methods to elect formal village councils may affect support for reconciliation with the Taliban. Each of the simulations was embedded within the broader survey on individual attitudes toward political institutions detailed in the previous section. Versions of the simulations were randomly assigned to respondents. Random assignment was used to ensure that the simulations provide insight into the causal impact of electoral institutions on the outcomes described in the sections ahead.

In addition to the nationwide survey, DI conducted 92 interviews and 53 focus group discussions in three key districts (Ghazni Center in Ghazni Province, Dehdadi District in Balkh Province, and Bazarak District in Panjsher Province) excluding 23 interviews and two focus group discus-

sions in Kabul. The qualitative data shed light into local political dynamics and provided individuals the opportunity to help explain their views in a way that may not be clear by looking solely at public opinion survey data.

Interview and focus group discussions were collected in two communities in each of the four districts. Generally, one of the communities was in or close to the district center while one was in an area outside of the district center. In each district, interview and focus group discussions featured an equal proportion of men and women and represented a cross-section of the ethnic composition of the area. In each community, focus group discussions were held with school teachers, religious leaders, and groups of men and women. In addition, semistructured interviews were conducted with village leaders (identified by community members), three young female adults (18-35 years old), three female adults (ages 35 and up), three young male adults (18-35 years old), and three male adults (18-35). Focus group discussions in provincial capitals were held with officials from the Independent Elections Commission who worked on recent elections, civil society and political party members, as well as community leaders. DI conducted interviews with district government officials and district security officials. Finally, DI also implemented focus group discussions and interviews with political parties, government officials and members of civil society organizations in Kabul.

KEY FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONWIDE SURVEY

The results of this survey demonstrate that Afghans are resoundingly civic-minded and participate in a wide range of political organizations—especially within their communities. Despite this eagerness to participate, Afghans are broadly dissatisfied with the way formal democracy works and expressed a lack of confidence in formal elected institutions, including the national assembly and the president. Just 9% of those surveyed say they are very satisfied with the way democracy works, and 16% say they are fairly satisfied. Nearly one-quarter are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, another 20% are not very satisfied, and close to one third (29%) are not satisfied all. Discontent with formal elected bodies is also manifested by the small proportion of Afghans who say they are willing to vote in future elections: only 42% say they will vote in the next national assembly elections and 40% say they will cast a vote in the next presidential elections.

Afghans do not perceive that the reduced numbers of international troops will affect the political status quo. The majority believe fighting in the country will continue, as 14% say fighting will definitely not end, 38% say it is possible but not likely, 27% believe it very likely, and just 10% believe fighting will definitely end. This appears to be a result of Afghan's pessimism with the ongoing national reconciliation process as only 9% believe reconciliation with the Taliban will happen with certainty, 22% believe it is very likely, 35% believe this is possible but not likely, and 21% believe it will definitely not happen. Afghans are equally pessimistic that the Taliban will be influential in politics in five years, as just 4% believe it is very likely, 15% likely, 24% neither likely nor unlikely, 27% unlikely, and 13% very unlikely. Furthermore, the establishment of formal democratic institutions has thus far not led Afghans to believe that political solutions are the most effective mechanism of dispute resolution as almost half of those surveyed (47%)

strongly agree that it is sometimes necessary to use violence to support a cause he or she believes is just.

Discussion of democracy and elections is challenging in Afghanistan as the people with whom DI spoke had vastly different understandings of both democracy and political parties. Neither of these terms have positive connotations for most Afghans. For many Afghans, the term democracy does not signify a representative system of government and has two general connotations. One meaning is deeply associated with a negative perception of Western popular culture as well as a lack of morality. In this sense, democracy for many stands in contrast with the values of Islam. Both men and women alike share this negative perception.

A second common understanding of the term democracy among Afghans is a system that promotes economic freedom and opportunities for personal prosperity. Many local entrepreneurs and small shopkeepers (and their families), view democracy as positive because it has given families opportunities to create small businesses, provided daily laborers opportunities for employment, and has generated prosperity for families. When respondents define democracy in this way, they are usually enthusiastic about democracy. When they define it as a moral or cultural system, they do not view democracy as a positive force in society. More Afghans with whom we spoke view democracy through a cultural, rather than economic, prism.

Nearly 10 years after the creation of formal democratic institutions, individuals rarely define democracy as a political system that represents citizen interests and holds politicians accountable. There is no uniformity in the concept of democracy among Afghans rendering the term almost meaningless. Generations of Afghan politicians have used democracy as a slogan, including reforms under King Zahir Shah in the 1960s as well as efforts by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to engage in radical social and economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s. This may contribute to the negative responses Afghans provide when they are asked about their satisfaction with democracy. Afghans have much more faith in informal institutions that represent their interests than they do in the formal institutions associated with the state. Thus, Afghans are supportive of representative institutions as long as these institutions are not associated with those of the formal state.

Despite dissatisfaction with aspects of formal democracy and dim perceptions of prospects for political reconciliation with the Taliban, most of those surveyed believe that democracy, in some form, will sustain in the country. Afghans were asked to discuss the likelihood of the next president coming to power through regularly scheduled elections. More than half of respondents believe there will be continuity in the political system and the next president will come to power through regularly scheduled elections. Just 10% believe the president will definitely not come to power through elections and 24% believe this is possible but not likely.

While Afghans are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan, it is not a direct result of electoral corruption in their communities. While allegations of corruption plagued recent elections in Afghanistan, survey data and interviews indicate that most Afghans believe electoral corruption does not occur within their polling station but instead at higher political levels.

Pessimism about democracy is consistent with the general pessimism Afghans have about the future direction of their country as only 24% believe the country is moving in the right direction, with 36% believing the country is moving in the wrong direction, and 30% believing the direction is mixed. Afghans also report a worsening of conditions related to bribery and corruption as

compared to a year ago—over half (54%) say the situation has worsened, 35% say their situation has remained the same, and just 8% say it has improved. Furthermore, 39% report a worsening of their economic situation, with 48% saying things have remained the same and just 11% reporting their situation has improved.

In interviews and focus group discussions, Afghans discussed the reasons for their disillusionment with formal democracy. Reasons for disillusionment include a sense that elected politicians do not deliver on their promises, electoral fraud, fear of attacks at polling places, mistrust of candidates, and a sense that their vote does not make a difference.

Afghans also expressed resounding disenchantment with the country's existing political parties. In fact, the term "political party" itself is met with extreme disapproval by most Afghans. In the survey, just 16% of the population says they support a political party. Nationwide, just 6% say that political parties represent average citizens very well. More than two-thirds (69%) say that political parties do not promote peace among the *qaums* (solidary groups including tribes and ethnic groups) of Afghanistan. Interviews and focus group discussions revealed that the term "political party" also has extremely negative connotations for most Afghans. For many, political parties represent armed factions that played an important role in fighting the Soviets and the Taliban.

Broadly speaking, Afghans do not define political parties as organizations that represent or protect the interests of Afghans in representative political institutions. For example, many Afghans say that political parties are active in their communities but do *not* play an active role in elections. However, they are active in other domains such as providing security, engaging in extortion, or providing some public goods and services. Although views on contemporary parties are largely negative, it is clear that political parties as Afghans understand them are not bodies that craft legislation or aggregate political interests. In these same discussions, Afghans strongly voiced support for the formation of new political groups that transcend ethnic or regional identities. The vast majority of individuals interviewed expressed a desire for the emergence of new political movements that can promote national unity. These types of groups have yet to emerge in the country.

In interviews, most Afghans say that political parties are not active in electoral politics, as current parties represent groups whose historic purpose was to defeat the Soviets and subsequently the Taliban. Afghans note that the activity of these parties, which are mostly regionally and ethnically based, has actually decreased in the past decade. Along these lines, 60% of those surveyed say that politicians who were once commanders in the war should be forbidden from holding office.

In Afghanistan, formal elections do not appear to have created accountability in public servants. Politicians who are formally elected to public bodies are not rated as more accountable than those who are unelected. Thus, elections themselves do not guarantee accountability. For example, the survey indicates that Afghans have more confidence in their unelected district governors than they do in their formally elected provincial councils (PCs). The interviews and focus group discussions help explain this. Despite the fact that district governors are unelected, Afghans call on them regularly when important issues arise and, in turn, many district governors have found effective ways to engage their constituents. In contrast, many Afghans perceive elected PCs as neither accessible nor representative of their needs. Instead, provincial councils are broadly perceived as arms of development agencies, provincial reconstruction teams, and nongovernmental

organizations. In discussions, when Afghans say they are aware of the activities of their PCs, they indicate that they are grateful for the role the PCs play in allocating donor assistance. While at times PCs may be effective in pursuing donor interests, Afghans do not believe them to be governing bodies that can hold other government officials accountable, represent constituent interests, or check the authority of other government agencies.

This research illustrates that most Afghans have very little interaction with their formally elected officials. Less than one-quarter of those surveyed can name a member of the national assembly from their province. Few state that members of the national assembly (4%) or provincial councils (7%) are “somewhat” or “very” accessible. Just 36% of those surveyed say they could identify a member of the national assembly doing something that benefitted the people in their community. In interviews and focus group discussions, Afghans rarely discuss positive accomplishments of their elected representatives.

The weakness of nationally based political parties may help explain why Afghans have very little confidence or knowledge about the activities of their elected officials. Of the 16% who support a political party, no single party attracts more than 5% of those surveyed. Policy-centered and nationally based political parties have yet to emerge. Although this is largely a consequence of an electoral system that suppresses the role of political parties in elections, the lack of new political movements means that the political parties active during the anti-Soviet jihad and anti-Taliban campaigns tend to dominate the political discourse. These parties typically organize along the fissures of Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious movements. While new political institutions have taken shape in the country, they have not been accompanied by a new set of nationally based political movements that engage in politics and are capable of representing citizen interests.

With the exception of provincial councils, Afghans give almost every local governing organization—both formal and informal—high marks for accessibility. Despite disenchantment with the performance of elected officials—including the president, the national assembly, and the provincial councils—Afghans actively participate in political activity in their communities. They have enormous confidence in their religious leaders, traditional leaders, such as *maliks* and *qaryadars*, as well as *jirgas* and *shuras*, who convene to solve local problems. The survey indicates that these local bodies are far more accessible to Afghans than their formally elected representatives. From interviews and focus group discussions, when individuals face problems and want government assistance, they turn to customary leaders or their district governor—rarely do they turn to their elected provincial councils or national assembly members.

In most parts of the country and in rural areas in particular, the informal system of governance has been able to provide important services to Afghans. DI asked a series of questions regarding land and property rights to understand how people relate to formal government authority in their communities. For example, of the 82% of Afghans who own land, 87% report having a customary deed issued in their community, while just 31% say they have a government-issued deed. When people have disputes about land in their communities they very rarely turn to state courts. Instead, 39% say they go to their customary community representatives (*malik*, *qaryadar*, *noma-yenda*, *wakil*, *khan*, etc.), 24% say they turn to their family, and 11% say they turn to a council such as a *shura* or *jirga*. Only 13% say they go to the district governor, another 13% say they go to a formal court, and just 1% say they turn to government sponsored community development councils (CDC). Along these lines, Afghans express strong support for governance that is inclu-

sive of customary leaders. Nearly two-thirds of respondents in rural Afghanistan (61%) say this is a good way of governing the country.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONWIDE PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

DIRECTION OF COUNTRY

Respondents were asked about the direction of the country and whether they believe things in the country are moving in the right direction. Afghans are not optimistic about the direction of the country, as 36% say the country is moving in the wrong direction. Just 24% say the country is moving in the right direction, and one-in-three (30%) believe the direction is mixed (partly in the right direction, partly in the wrong direction).

The Pashtun population is by far the most pessimistic about the direction of the country, as 41% of Pashtuns believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, while only 19% believe the country is moving in the right direction. This is in contrast to the Tajik population, of which 30% believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, while 26% believe the country is moving in the right direction. Hazaras share similar perceptions as Tajiks; 31% of Hazaras believe the country is moving in the wrong direction, and 27% see the country moving in the right direction.

Those who hold optimistic views about the direction of the country were asked to give two reasons as to why they have this belief. Good reconstruction is the reason most commonly cited (43%), followed by good security (28%), the fact that schools for girls have opened (28%), and by the presence of international assistance (26%). Issues related to democracy and good governance are among the least cited issues by Afghans. Only 16% cite good government as a reason for optimism, another 16% cite democracy and elections, and just 11% cite having a good constitution.

Those individuals who believe the country is moving in the wrong direction were asked to provide two reasons as to why this is the case. The most cited reason for pessimism about the future of the country is insecurity, as it is mentioned by nearly half of all respondents (47%). This is followed by bad government (26%), administrative corruption (24%), presence of the Taliban (15%), and killing of innocent people (14%). Reconstruction, which is the primary source of optimism, is cited by only 12%, ranking sixth among reasons for pessimism. Overall, Afghans are pessimistic for reasons associated with public goods and poor government performance.

Respondents were asked to name the two most pressing problems facing Afghanistan as a whole. Nearly half of those surveyed (45%) mention issues of security (including political violence and terrorism) as one of the biggest problems facing the country. This is followed by economic concerns like unemployment (36%) and poor economic conditions (27%). Finally, individuals identify weak authority of the government and government corruption (21%) as one of the biggest problems facing the country as a whole.

There are notable differences in how Afghans assess problems in the country as a whole versus those in their communities. Although nearly half of those surveyed believe security to be the

most important problem facing the country, only 16% say this is the most important issue facing them in their communities. In their communities, individuals most commonly cite unemployment (36%), followed by the lack of electricity (29%), roads (26%), and poverty (21%). Security issues fall to fifth place among issues most problematic in the individual communities of those surveyed. In their communities, Afghans are more likely to be concerned with economic and public goods provision than with security issues.

Nationally, 9% of those surveyed list governance issues and corruption as a major concern, but this number doubles (20%) for respondents in southern Afghanistan. Residents in the west (4%) and the center (5%) of the country express the least concern over issues of governance. Notably, issues of security are most concerning to individuals in the east (25%) and the south (21%). Unemployment is a major concern for individuals in eastern Afghanistan, where 44% list this as a primary concern in their community. Of all regions in Afghanistan, residents in the north register the lowest level of concern about unemployment, with 30% citing this as a major problem in their community.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

When discussing the economic conditions in the country as a whole, only a small percentage of Afghans assess the situation positively: just 3% believe the economic situation is very good, and 13% believe the situation is fairly good. This is in stark contrast to one-in-five (19%) who consider the current situation to be very bad or more than one-third (34%) who believe the current situation is fairly bad. There are no significant differences in perceptions of the country's economic situation between men and women, those in urban and rural areas, or even by region. Across all important dimensions, only about 15% of the population has positive attitudes—describing present conditions as fairly good or very good—regarding the economy.

When speaking about their present living conditions, Afghans in general are far more optimistic than they are about the economic condition of the country as a whole, with a quarter (25%) describing their own conditions as fairly good, and 4% describing their situation as very good. Despite overall pessimism about the state of the Afghan economy (with only 16% having positive views), nearly one-in-three express positive views about their own living conditions. Countrywide, 40% believe their own condition is neither good nor bad, 22% believe the situation is fairly bad, and 8% believe it to be very bad.

CHANGES IN THE PAST YEAR

Across the board, Afghans report a serious worsening of conditions that relate to law and order and economic opportunities. On the other hand, the research indicates some improvement in areas related to infrastructure and public goods. Of the various issues Afghans were asked about, individuals report the most significant decline in bribery and corruption, which has worsened considerably as compared to a year ago. Over half of the population (54%) reports that the situation has gotten worse, 35% report that things have remained the same, and just 8% say things have gotten better.

Similarly, Afghans saw little improvement in the areas of security: 16% report improvements, 42% report that the situation is about the same, and 41% say the situation has gotten worse in the past year. Results are quite similar with regard to freedom of movement: just 9% report an improvement in this situation, 52% report that things have remained the same, while 36% report

that the situation has gotten worse. Half of the population reports a worsening in crime in the past year, 36% say crime levels have remained the same, and just 10% say that crime has improved.

Few of those surveyed indicate that the country's economy has improved in the past year: 39% report a worsening in the country's economic conditions, 48% say things have remained the same, and just 11% report that the situation has improved.

Although a majority of Afghans do not report improvement on any single issue about which they were asked, there is some indication that the situation related to infrastructure and some public goods is not perceived to have worsened over the past year. For example, the availability of education for children is the issue on which individuals report the strongest relative perception of improvement: 45% of Afghans say availability of education improved, 40% say it has remained the same, while 14% say things have gotten worse in the last year. This is followed by the availability of clean drinking water: 36% report improvement, 47% report things have stayed the same, and 17% report things have gotten worse over the past year.

SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY

Afghans appear to be quite dissatisfied with the way democracy functions in Afghanistan. In response to the question of whether they are satisfied with the way democracy works in Afghanistan, close to one-third (29%) are not satisfied at all, another 20% are not very satisfied, and nearly one-quarter are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. Just 9% say they are very satisfied with the way democracy works and 16% say they are fairly satisfied. Only 1% claim "Afghanistan is not a democracy." Satisfaction with democracy is highest among the younger population and decreases with older age groups. The youngest people surveyed (ages 18-24) are the happiest with democracy: 14% say they are very satisfied, and 27% say they are somewhat satisfied. This is in contrast to the oldest population group surveyed, those over 55, of whom just 5% are very satisfied, and 7% are fairly satisfied with the way democracy works.

Despite disappointment with democracy, Afghanistan has made important strides toward the consolidation of democratic processes: elections have been held with regularity, voters are fairly well educated on how to vote, and politicians have gained greater experience participating in campaigns. Notwithstanding these remarkable achievements, each successive round of elections has been met with increased security challenges and allegations of fraud and misconduct. Although 52% of those interviewed say they voted in the 2009 presidential elections, just 40% say they would participate in the next presidential elections. Similarly, nearly half of the population (48%) says that they would not vote in future national assembly elections.

ROLE OF STATE AND OTHER IMPORTANT ACTORS IN SOCIETY

The survey asked Afghans if they believe citizens need more protection from the government. Overwhelmingly, Afghans believe that they do need more protection from the state—61% say they strongly agree, 27% say they somewhat agree, 7% say they neither agree nor disagree, 3% say they somewhat disagree, and just 1% say they strongly disagree.

One of the most important questions in Afghan politics today is the role religious leaders should play in making government decisions. When asked whether religious leaders should have an important role in government decisions, less than 1% strongly disagree, 7% somewhat disagree,

23% neither agree nor disagree, 35% somewhat agree, while almost one-third (31%) strongly agree. There are no major differences of opinion among men or women or by looking at different age groups.

Individuals were asked whether politicians who were once commanders in the war should be forbidden from holding public office. Almost two-thirds of the population believes that former commanders should not be allowed to hold political office: 38% strongly agree and another 22% somewhat agree. Just 6% strongly disagree, 14% somewhat disagree, and 15% neither agree nor disagree.

Afghans were asked about their attitudes toward political parties. Specifically, the survey sought to understand whether political parties could be a source of unity in the country. The survey asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: political parties only create division and confusion among the *qaums* of Afghanistan. The result highlights that there is a strong feeling that political parties are not a means for creating unity in the country. Nearly half of the population strongly agrees with this statement (48%), 21% somewhat agree, 14% neither agree nor disagree, 5% somewhat disagree, and 3% strongly disagree.

The survey sought to understand how well Afghans perceive the importance of separation of powers between distinct branches of government, as is called for in the current constitution. In an attempt to capture these attitudes, Afghans were asked whether members of the national assembly should make laws for the country, even if the president disagrees. There is, in fact, strong support for separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches: 41% strongly agree that the national assembly should make laws even if the president does not agree, 22% somewhat agree, 14% neither agree nor disagree, 11% somewhat disagree, and just 5% strongly disagree.

MODELS OF GOVERNANCE

Individuals were asked to rate various ways of governing the country—selecting strong leaders without elections, having experts rule, having religious leaders rule, having elders and tribal leaders rule, or selecting leaders through formal elections. After nearly 10 years of procedural democracy, many Afghans remain skeptical of the need for democratic procedures to choose their leaders. Nearly half of the population says that strong leadership without holding elections would be a good way of governing the country, as 28% say this would be a fairly good way of selecting leaders, and another 18% say this would be a very good way of selecting leaders. Only 18% say that this would be a bad way of governing the country, and 13% say this would be a fairly bad way of governing.

Of the various models presented, Afghans express the strongest support for having “experts” rather than politicians make laws according to what they believe to be best: 39% believe this would be a very good way of governing Afghanistan, and 29% say that this would be a fairly good way. Only 1% say this would be a bad way of governing and only 5% say expert rule would be fairly bad.

There is also strong support among the population for having religious leaders govern Afghanistan. More than half of the population believes that having religious leaders rule is a good way of governing Afghanistan: 26% believe this is a very good way of governing, and another 32% say this is a fairly good way of governing the country. Just 4% say this is a bad way, 8% say this is a fairly bad way of governing the country, and nearly one-in-three (27%) are undecided.

Similarly, there is strong support for a more traditional governance model in which elders and tribal leaders rule Afghanistan. Nearly two-thirds of the population expresses support for leadership by elders and tribal leaders: 27% believe this is a very good way of governing, 34% say this is a fairly good way of governing, and 21% say this is neither good nor bad. Just 9% believe it is a fairly bad way, and 6% believe this to be a bad way of governing Afghanistan.

When asked specifically about having elections to elect national and local leaders, over half of Afghans say this would be a good way of selecting them: 31% say elections would be very good and another 23% say they would be fairly good.

TALIBAN, FIGHTING, AND POLITICAL STABILITY

A considerable number of Afghans do not believe that the Taliban will be influential in Afghan politics in the near future. When asked about whether it is likely that the Taliban would be influential in politics in Afghanistan five years from now, just 4% view this as very likely, while 15% believe it is likely, 13% say that this is very unlikely and 27% say that it is unlikely. Close to one-quarter (24%) say it is neither likely nor unlikely.

Afghans do not believe fighting in the country will end in the next two years. When asked whether they believe the most serious fighting in the country would end in the next two years, most citizens express pessimism, as 14% say this will definitely not happen, and another 38% say this is possible but not likely. An additional 27% believe it is very likely, and just 10% believe this will certainly happen.

The population is sanguine about prospects for reconciliation with the Taliban. Only about one-third of the population believes it is likely the government will reconcile with the Taliban in the next two years: just 9% believe this will happen with certainty, while 22% believe it is very likely. On the other hand, two-thirds of the population believes reconciliation is not likely: 21% believe it will definitely not happen, while another 35% believe this is possible but not likely.

Afghans were also asked to discuss the likelihood that the next president of Afghanistan will come to power through regularly scheduled elections. More than half of respondents (56%) believe there will be stability in the political system, as they expect that the next president will come to power through regularly scheduled elections. Just 10% believe the president will definitely not come to power through regularly scheduled elections, and about one-quarter (24%) believe this is possible but not likely.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Individuals were asked a series of questions about their trust in a range of political institutions in the country, ranging from national level political organizations to their trust in community political organizations.

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- **President:** Of those surveyed, 25% have a lot of confidence in the president, 34% have some confidence, while 40% of the population express no confidence in the president.
- **Wolesi Jirga:** Individuals express even stronger reservations in the lower house of the national assembly, the Wolesi Jirga. Only 7% of the population express a lot of confi-

dence in the Wolesi Jirga, 46% have some confidence in the body, while 43% have no confidence in the body.

- **Supreme Court:** Of all national level political bodies, those interviewed have the least amount of confidence in the supreme court: Just 9% express a lot of confidence in the body, 28% express some confidence, while 57% express no confidence in the body.
- **Independent Elections Commission:** Confidence in the Independent Elections Commission is similarly low, with only 7% having a lot of confidence in the body, 35% having some confidence, and 50% expressing no confidence in the body.
- **Political Parties:** Political parties in general and the Taliban in particular share the least amount of public support of all the political institutions—at the national, subnational, or local level—that DI asked about in this survey. Only 8% say they have a lot of confidence, 23% state they have some confidence in political parties, and 59% say they have no confidence at all.

SUBNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- **District Governors:** Of all formal government bodies at the subnational level, Afghans express the strongest support for their district governors—although support for them is mixed: 22% say they have a lot of confidence in district governors, 29% say they have some confidence, and 24% express no confidence.
- **Provincial Councils:** It is interesting to note that Afghans express more confidence in their unelected district governors than they do in their elected provincial councils. Of those surveyed, 15% express a lot of confidence in their provincial council, 40% express some confidence, while 30% express no confidence.
- **Local Customary Leaders:** Local leaders, often informal or customary leaders, are among the most trusted political figures in Afghanistan. When asked, 35% say they have a lot of confidence in their customary leaders (defined as *malik/arbab/khan/qaryadar*) and another 51% say they have some confidence in these leaders. Just 11% say they have no confidence in their customary leaders.
- **Community Development Councils:** There is more variation in trust of government- and donor-sponsored community development councils. Afghans have confidence in donor-sponsored community development councils, but this support is lukewarm in comparison to confidence in customary leaders. Just 17% of the population says they have a lot of confidence in the CDCs, 44% say they have some confidence, and 29% say they have no confidence in them.

SECURITY FORCES

- **Afghan National Army:** Afghans do not have enormous confidence in any of the security forces in the country, although they have more confidence in the Afghan National Army than they do in the Afghan National Police or local commanders. Afghans express some trust in the Afghan National Army: 30% express a lot of confidence, 25% have some confidence, and 40% have no confidence.
- **Afghan National Police:** Fewer Afghans have confidence in the Afghan National Police, as nearly half (48%) have no confidence in their abilities, 32% have some confidence, and only 17% have a lot of confidence in them.
- **Local Commanders:** The level of confidence among the population for commanders is somewhat higher than it is for the Taliban, with just 5% having a lot of confidence, 41% having some confidence, and 46% having no confidence.
- **Taliban:** Of those individuals or bodies asked about in the survey, individuals have the least amount of support for the Taliban. Only 6% of the population says they have a lot of confidence in the Taliban, 12% say they have some confidence, and 73% say they have no confidence in them.

ENGAGEMENT WITH ELECTIONS

The survey also addressed the engagement of respondents in past elections so as to help understand individual attitudes towards elections and voting.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

The survey asked whether people voted in the most recent presidential elections (2009/1388): about half of those surveyed (52%) say they voted. Of those who did not vote, 15% say they were not registered or were too young to vote, 15% say they decided not to vote, 8% say they were prevented from voting, 3% say they did not have time to vote, 1% say they could not find the polling station, and 5% say they had some other reason for not voting. While 52% say they voted in the most recent presidential election, just 40% say they planned on voting in the next presidential elections and nearly half of those surveyed (48%) say they do not plan on voting.

The survey then asked individuals how satisfied they are with the performance of President Karzai in the past ten years. Of those surveyed, 18% say they are very satisfied, 26% say they are satisfied, 25% say they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 15% say they are dissatisfied, and 14% say they are very dissatisfied.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Respondents were also asked whether they voted in the most recent national assembly elections (2010/1389) and if so, they were asked to explain why this was the case. More than half of respondents (54%) say they voted in these elections, 17% say they did not vote, 13% say they were not registered or were too young to vote, 9% say they were prevented from voting, 2% say they did not have time to vote, and just 1% say they could not find the polling station. Self-reported voting among the Pashtun population is substantially lower than for other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Voter turnout is notably higher among the ethnic minorities in Afghanistan: 78% of Turkmens, 70% of Uzbeks, and 67% of Hazaras report voting in the most recent national assem-

bly elections. This is in contrast to 42% of Pashtuns who report voting in the most recent elections.

In addition to asking individuals about whether they voted in the elections, DI also asked Afghans to discuss whether they believe people in their neighborhood voted. In some cases, even though respondents will tell you they voted even if this is not the case, they may be more likely to give you a more honest assessment of their neighbor's behavior. Therefore, the survey asked whether they believe that people in their neighborhood turned out to vote. This figure is lower than the 54% who say that they themselves voted in the elections. The results of this question are evenly split: 45% report that most people voted and 44% report that most people stayed at home

Those who voted say they did so because they are concerned about issues facing the country as a whole, especially concerning peace and security. Of those who voted, 64% say they voted to improve peace and security in the country, 45% say they voted out of patriotism, 39% say they voted to improve people's lives, and 35% say they voted because it is their duty. Just 18% say they voted to bring more services to their community and only 13% say they voted so that they could see their favorite candidate win.

On the other hand, when discussing reasons why they chose not to vote, individual reasons are far more personal in nature, such as fearing violence or dissatisfaction with the previous elections. When asked the top three reasons why respondents chose not to vote in the recent national assembly elections, 44% say they made this decision due to the fact that they feared attacks and general insecurity. Aside from fear for their own personal security, other reasons individuals mention for not voting have to do with lack of trust in the electoral system: 41% say they did not vote due to fraud experienced in previous elections, 40% say they did not trust the candidates, and 38% say they did not vote because they were not satisfied with the candidates, as they believe they are all corrupt. Just 6% of respondents say that their vote was not secret and other people know how they voted.

The survey was also designed to help understand individual attitudes toward future elections. To this end, the survey asked people whether they plan to vote in the next Wolesi Jirga elections. Just 42% of the population says they intend to vote, while 48% say they will not.

CONSTITUENT RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

To better understand why people vote and to get a sense of the importance individual candidates may play in encouraging people to vote, DI asked voters more specific questions about their knowledge of members of the national assembly.

Nearly half of those surveyed say they cannot name a member of the national assembly from their province, and another 29% refused to answer, saying the name of the person they know best is confidential. Less than one-quarter of those surveyed can name a member of the national assembly. The survey also probed the degree of familiarity individuals have with the member of the national assembly they know best. The survey then asked whether they voted for this same person in the previous national assembly elections (2005). Overall, the results are split: 51% say they voted for this person before and 49% say this past election was the first time they voted for them. When asked whether the national assembly member they know best knows the respondent by name, 26% of those surveyed report this is the case, indicating that they have a personal relationship with this member of the national assembly.

On the other hand, 69% say that the member of the national assembly they know best does not know them by name. When asked whether the member of the national assembly they know best has taken any actions while in office to help people in the province, respondents are split: 36% say yes, while 52% say this member has not assisted the province. A majority of the population (72%) says that the winner has not been able to improve government services, while 16% say the member has been able to improve government services.

Respondents were asked to rank the importance of a number of qualities and skills that might be important for members of the national assembly to possess in dealing with their constituents. The vast majority (67%) of respondents believe it is most important for national assembly members to listen to voters and represent their needs. This is followed by those who say that it is important for national assembly members to deliver jobs and development to their province (21%); make laws for the good of the country (12%); and monitor the president and his government (5%). The results indicate that individuals believe the primary role of members of the national assembly is to liaise with citizens and deliver development and jobs to their province.

POLITICAL PARTIES

The survey asked a series of questions about how individuals feel about political parties to get a sense of individual engagement and involvement with parties. Respondents were asked whether they support a particular political party in the country. Less than 20% of the population in Afghanistan supports a political party: 16% say they support a party, while 84% say they do not. Respondents, regardless of whether they belong to a political party, were also asked which political party they identify with the most. They did not have to say whether they were a member of the party, just whether they felt close to a particular party. Eighty-four percent of respondents say they do not feel close to any political party, and of the remaining survey respondents, no political party received more than 5% support nationwide.

Individuals were asked about the degree to which political parties reflect the views of average citizens in Afghanistan. In general, Afghans do not believe that political parties reflect the views of the average citizen, with just 24% saying they do. Finally, the survey asked about the role of political parties in promoting peace among *qaums* or solidarity groups in Afghanistan: 7% say they do this very well; 18% say they do this well; 22% say they do not do this very well; and nearly half (47%) say they do not do this very well at all.

LOCAL POLITICS

Any survey of attitudes toward the government and politics in Afghanistan would be incomplete without an exploration of issues regarding local politics, especially politics in rural areas where approximately 80% of the Afghan population resides. As the results in the previous sections indicate, individuals have more trust and confidence in local level institutions than they do in national level political institutions.

Individuals were asked whether they have a customary village leader (i.e., *malik*, *khan*, *qarydar*, *wakil*, or *nomayenda*) in their community. These exist in rural areas as well as urban areas (where they are often referred to as *qalantars* or other titles). Nearly 100% of communities say this is the case. This illustrates the resilience of customary political organization throughout the country. Respondents were also asked whether they have a customary-based council in their community, typically known as a *shura* or a *jirga*. These are not typically fixed bodies, but instead are formed to resolve disputes or other matters when they arise. They are present in ap-

proximately 81% of communities, while 15% indicate that they do not have them. Finally, respondents were asked whether they have a donor-sponsored community development council in their community: 68% report having CDCs, while 23% say this is not the case. The survey found that:

- **Religious leaders are the most accessible of all locally based leaders:** 60% believe their religious leaders are very accessible, while 36% believe they are somewhat accessible, and none of the respondents believe they are not accessible at all.
- **Members of the national assembly are not very accessible to individuals in their community:** Just 1% report them as very accessible, 3% say they are somewhat accessible, 3% say they are not very accessible, 27% say they are not accessible at all, while 62% say they do not have access to them in their community.
- **CDCs are increasingly present in rural Afghanistan, although they are not nearly as accessible to Afghans as their customary councils or religious leaders:** 21% say they are very accessible, and 45% say they are somewhat accessible. Less than 1% say they are not very accessible, and 2% say they are not accessible at all. On the other hand, 23% of Afghans say they do not have these bodies in their community.
- **Provincial councils are not very accessible to members of the community:** Just 1% say they are very accessible, 6% say they are somewhat accessible, 28% say they are not very accessible, and over half (52%) say they are not accessible at all. Just 9% say they do not have provincial council representation in their communities.
- **District government (*woluswali*) officials appear to be the most accessible formal organization:** 31% report them as somewhat accessible, 32% say they are not very accessible, and 18% say they are not accessible at all. Just 16% say they do not have this organization in their community.
- **Provincial government (*wiloyat*) level officials are not very accessible in their community:** 8% say their provincial government officials are accessible, 8% say they are somewhat accessible, 5% say they are not very accessible, and 18% say they are not accessible at all. Over half (57%) say they do not have access to provincial government officials in their area.

LAND AND CONFLICT | The final general section of the survey asked people about the land situation in their communities. Conflict over land ignites some of the most serious conflict inside Afghanistan. Many have attributed the rise of the legitimacy of the Taliban to its ability to mediate land disputes. The Taliban's attention to arbitrating land disputes illustrates to many Afghans an ability to grapple with a foundational governance issue where the government in Kabul has largely failed. For the purposes of this survey, understanding the nature of land ownership and how individuals deal with disputes over land provides a window into how Afghans interact with their local governments. The informal system of local governance has been able to provide important services to Afghans, despite the weakness of the formal government at the local level. The findings here illustrate that customary systems of governance remain far more legitimate and accessible to most Afghans than any alternative offered by Kabul.

Most Afghans own land: 82% of Afghans report owning land, while 18% say they do not. Those who own land either have a state-issued or customary-based legal title for this land. Just 31% say they have a state-backed legal title for their land, while 67% say they do not. On the other hand, 87% say they have a customary land title, while 10% say they do not have a customary title. The prevalence of customary land deeds combined with the low level of government issued deeds illustrates the primacy of customary forms of governance despite nearly a decade of state-building efforts.

Respondents were asked whether they have ever had a dispute over land they rent or own: 27% report having a dispute, while 73% say they have never had a dispute. To get a better sense of how government operates at the local level, individuals were asked where they sought help when they needed to resolve land disputes. The results indicate that individuals turn overwhelmingly to informal bodies at the local level: 39% report turning to a customary community leader such as a *malik*, 24% say they turn to their family, 13% say they turn to a local government official such as a district governor or the head of the district police, another 13% say they go to a formal court, 11% say they turn to a customary council such as a shura or a jirga, and just 1% say they turn to a donor-sponsored CDC. When asked how satisfied they are with the procedures used to resolve this dispute, 28% say they are very satisfied, 47% say they are somewhat satisfied, 13% say they are not satisfied at all, and another 13% say the dispute was not resolved.

FINDINGS FROM SURVEY-BASED ELECTORAL SIMULATIONS

DI embedded two survey-based simulations in the nationwide public opinion survey in an attempt to gain a better understanding of the potential implications of reforms debated in the Afghan media and civil society. The purpose of these simulations was to understand how potential electoral reform might affect the behavior and attitudes of voters. These kinds of simulations have been widely used throughout the world to help policy makers better understand how changes in policy might affect important outcomes.¹

ELECTORAL REFORM - WOLESI JIRGA ELECTIONS

This simulation explores how electoral reform would affect the Wolesi Jirga elections, particularly who may get elected to this body, and whether alternate systems might induce stronger support for democracy. In the simulation, DI tested implications of four distinct electoral systems: single non-transferable voting (SNTV); district-based constituencies using first past the post (FPTP) voting methods; single transferable voting (STV) (proportional representation); and block voting (BV). Under FPTP and SNTV, voters can cast a vote for only one candidate. Under STV and BV, voters can vote for more than one candidate. As expected, the results indicate that a move to STV or BV, where voters can cast a ballot for more than one candidate, greatly enhances the representation of minority groups in the Wolesi Jirga. The survey also indicates that

¹ Diana C. Mutz, *Population-Based Survey Experiments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011).

while reform increases minority representation, it also serves to slightly increase representation of candidates affiliated with the current government. A reform from SNTV to STV may increase incumbent reelection by 0.2%, and a shift to block voting may boost reelection of current representatives by 6.7%. The least-friendly system to incumbents is the current system of SNTV. Representation of female candidates increases slightly under STV. The model postulates that a shift from SNTV to STV may increase female representation in parliament by 4.6%, and a reform from SNTV to block voting may expand it by 3.4%. Representation of Taliban-related candidates increases significantly in a move from SNTV to systems where voters can cast more than one vote (STV or BV). Finally, if the SNTV voting system is altered to STV, the election of candidates associated with the Taliban may increase by 14.7%. Similarly, a switch to block voting may increase Taliban-related representatives by 12.4%.

VILLAGE COUNCIL ELECTIONS

The second simulation considers various methods used to select members of formal village councils. Although the 2004 constitution calls for village council members to be elected (Article 140), council elections have yet to be held. There is an ongoing debate in Afghanistan about the best way to conduct these elections. The simulation allows respondents to select village councils under three systems: SNTV (using formal elections); elections using donor-supported community development councils; and customary methods. The results show no significant difference between whom voters will select to their village council under the three systems, but when respondents chose their village council through customary methods, they are much more likely to support reconciliation with the Taliban.

ABOUT ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which was ratified by a consensus of a national Loya Jirga in January 2004, calls for the president, national assembly, provincial councils, district councils, and municipal councils to be elected through “free, general, secret, and direct” elections supervised by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Despite enormous security challenges, the country has held two presidential elections (2004 and 2009), two national assembly elections (2005 and 2010), and two provincial council elections (2004 and 2009). District and village council elections have yet to be held.

Afghanistan held its first post-Taliban presidential election in October, 2004. There were 18 candidates who appeared on the ballot. Hamid Karzai won as an independent candidate with 55% of the vote, garnering more than three times the votes cast for the second-place candidate, Yunus Qanuni, who received about 16% of the vote. Voter turnout in the 2004 presidential election was reported to be around 70%, which was considered substantial for a post-conflict democracy.

Afghanistan held its first legislative elections in September, 2005 to select representatives for the national assembly, which consists of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house (the “house of the people”); and the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house (the “house of the elders”). The election resulted in a highly fractionalized legislature. The first democratically elected legislature consisted of members who were affiliated with 33 political parties. Of the 249 members, the lower house was

almost evenly divided among pro-government (81 seats), pro-opposition (84 seats), and non-aligned (84 seats). The majority of seats went to independents (93 seats), followed by conservative or fundamentalist politicians (66 seats), moderates and traditionalists (47 seats), and liberals (43 seats).²

Voter turnout was reported at about 50% of registered voters, which was substantially lower than the 2004 presidential election held just eleven months earlier. Several factors contributed to low turnout, notwithstanding dissatisfaction with the performance of President Karzai and his government. Security considerations played a role in the low turnout, with the least secure provinces unsurprisingly exhibiting the lowest turnout.

Afghanistan's second presidential election was held in August of 2009. Unlike the first election, which by most accounts was conducted well, the second election was mired in controversy, which resulted in investigations into corruption and fraud for several months after election day. Unlike in 2004, Karzai failed to win enough votes to avoid a second-round runoff election. Despite having won nearly 50% of the vote compared to 30% for runner-up Abdullah Abdullah, the election commission announced that a runoff election would be necessary. Shortly after this announcement, however, Abdullah announced he would not participate in the runoff, thus handing Karzai the victory. Voter turnout was about 33%, which was less than half the turnout in the election just five years earlier. Polls and interviews indicated that many people have simply lost interest in the elections. Security concerns also contributed to the lower participation rate.

On September 18, 2010, Afghanistan held its second election for the national assembly. Again, the vote culminated in a fractionalized legislature, with more than 21 political parties represented. As with the second presidential election, the second legislative election was far more controversial than the first election five years earlier. As a result of fraud, the Independent Election Commission rejected large portions of votes. In addition, a special tribunal created through presidential decree challenged the independence of the electoral authorities by claiming authority to examine electoral regularities and make decisions on candidate disqualification. The new Wolesi Jirga was seated in January, 2011, despite an ongoing investigation by the special tribunal. When the tribunal had completed its work, it called for the removal of 64 members of the legislature. Ultimately, only 9 members were removed.

Turnout was much lower in the second legislative election than the first. According to official numbers, 36% of eligible voters participated, but a precise number is elusive because of allegations of voter fraud. Security continued to play an important role in the 2010 elections. Taliban intimidation was reported in several villages, and a number of candidates campaigned under threat from local anti-government elements. Indifference and dissatisfaction with the 2009 election also contributed to the decline in voter turnout.

² Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, "A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections," Kabul, December 2005.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY RESULTS

REGION

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Central	26
Northern	16
Southern	14
Eastern	9
Western	10
North-Eastern	8
South-Western	17

GEOGRAPHIC CODE

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Village	79
Town	7
City	4
Metro (Kabul)	10

PROVINCE

Base: All respondents 8620	(%)
Kabul	11
Parwan	2
Kapisa	2
Wardak	2
Logar	2
Panjshir	5
Bamyan	2
Balkh	8
Faryab	2
Juazjan	2
Samangan	2
Sar-e-Pul	2
Paktia	2
Ghazni	7
Paktika	2
Khost	2
Nangerhar	3
Laghman	2
Kunar	2
Nooristan	2
Herat	4
Farah	2
Ghor	2
Badghis	2
Badakhshan	2
Kunduz	2
Baghlan	2
Takhar	2
Kandahar	7
Helmand	2
Zabul	2
Urozgan	2
Deh Kondi	2
Nimroz	2

AGE

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Below 18	0
18-24	32
25-34	30
35-44	20
45-54	11
55 or above	7
Don't know	0
Refused	0

ETHNICITY

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Pashtun	47
Tajik	33
Uzbek	6
Turkmen	2
Hazara	10
Baloch	0
Kyrgyz	0
Nuristani	2
Other	0
Arab	0
Pshae	0
Don't know	0
Refused	0

OCCUPATION

Base: All Respondents 3394	(%)
Farmer (own land/tenant farmer)	26
Farmer laborer (other's land)	8
Laborer, domestic, or unskilled worker	9
Informal sales/business	8
Skilled worker, artisan	15
Government office, clerical	4
Government office-executive/manager	3
Private office-clerical worker	3
Self-employed professional	6
Small business owner	7
School/University teacher	7
Afghan National Army	2
Afghan National Police	1
Other	0
Don't know	0
Refused	0

SURVEY QUESTIONS

QUESTION 1:

Do you own any of the following?

Base: All Respondents 8620	Yes (%)	No (%)	Refused (%)	Don't Know (%)
a.)Radio	87.3	12.7	-	-
b.)TV	48.7	51.3	-	-
c.)Phone	73.2	26.8	-	-
d.)Automobile	20.6	79.4	-	-
e.)Radio	37.1	62.9	-	-
f.)None of them	1.4	98.6	-	-

QUESTION 2A:

In your view, what is the **biggest problem** facing Afghanistan as a whole?

Base: All Responses 8620	(%)
Security issues/violence/terrorism	35.2
Poor economy and poverty	13.3
Unemployment	15.1
Education/schools	4.6
Government/ Weak authority/ Corruption	8.4
Lack of electricity	4
Roads	2.5
Health care	1.9
Drinking water	1.2
Crime	2.2
Other	11.5

QUESTION 2B:

In your view, what is **the 2nd-biggest problem** facing Afghanistan as a whole?

Base: All Responses 8620	(%)
Security issues/violence/terrorism	9.8
Poor economy and poverty	13.8
Unemployment	20.9
Education/schools	5.8
Government/ Weak authority/ Corruption	12.5
Lack of electricity	8.2
Roads	5.9
Health care	4.3
Drinking water	2.6
Crime	5.5
Other	10.7

QUESTION 3A:

Think about your local area and your community. What is the **biggest problem** facing your community?

Base: All Responses 8620	(%)
Security issues/violence/terrorism	12.7
Poor economy and poverty	12.6
Unemployment	21.5
Education/schools	6.7
Government/ Weak authority/ Corruption	3.3
Lack of electricity	14
Roads	11.7
Health care	6.5
Drinking water	6.5
Crime	1.1
Other	3.4

QUESTION 3B:

Think about your local area and your community. What's the **2nd-biggest problem** in your community?

Base: All Responses 8620	(%)
Security issues/violence/terrorism	3.4
Poor economy and poverty	8.1
Unemployment	14.7
Education/schools	7.3
Government/ Weak authority/ Corruption	5.6
Lack of electricity	15.3
Roads	14.2
Health care	11.3
Drinking water	7.7
Crime	3.9
Other	8.6

QUESTION 4:

Generally speaking do you think things in Afghanistan today are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Wrong direction	35.5
Some in right, some in wrong	30.3
Right direction	23.9
Don't know	10.3

QUESTION 5A:

Why do you think the country is moving in the **right** direction? **1st reason**

Base: All Respondents 1995	(%)
Good security	21.1
Good reconstruction	27.2
Schools for girls have opened	14.1
Good government	6.2
International assistance	12.8
Travel possible	2.2
Peace/End of war	4.1
Having a good constitution	3.9
Democracy/Elections	4.7
Other	3.8

QUESTION 5B:

Why do you think the country is moving in the **right** direction? **2nd reason**

Base: All Respondents 1995	(%)
Good security	7
Good reconstruction	15.7
Schools for girls have opened	13.4
Good government	10.1
International assistance	13.1
Travel possible	5.6
Peace/End of war	6.8
Having a good constitution	7.4
Democracy/Elections	11.4
Other	9.5

QUESTION 6A:

Why do you think the country is moving in the **wrong** direction? **1st reason**

Base: All Respondents 3245	(%)
No reconstruction has occurred	9.4
Lack of aid	5.9
Insecurity	35.6
Bad government	15.7
Bad economy	4.5
Presence of Taliban	4.8
Innocent people being killed	6.2
Administrative corruption	9.2
Poor education system	1.2
Neighboring countries causing problems	2.7
Other	4.9

QUESTION 6B:

Why do you think the country is moving in the **wrong** direction? **2nd reason**

Base: All Respondents 3245	(%)
No reconstruction has occurred	2.8
Lack of aid	4.9
Insecurity	11.7
Bad government	10.7
Bad economy	11.6
Presence of Taliban	10
Innocent people being killed	8.2
Administrative corruption	14.6
Poor education system	3
Neighboring countries causing problems	5.7
Other	16.9

QUESTION 7A:

In general, how would you describe the present economic conditions of Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Very bad	18.7
Fairly bad	34.1
Neither good nor bad	28.4
Fairly good	12.9
Very good	2.8
Don't know	3.1

QUESTION 7B:

In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Very bad	8.1
Fairly bad	22.1
Neither good nor bad	39.6
Fairly good	25
Very good	4.2
Don't know	1

QUESTION 8:

In your opinion, how likely is it that the Taliban will be influential in politics in Afghanistan five years from now?

Base: All Respondents	(%)
Very unlikely	12.8
Unlikely	26.9
Neither likely nor unlikely	23.9
Likely	14.5
Very likely	4
Don't know	17.9

QUESTION 9A:

What do you think is the chance of most serious fighting ending in the next two years?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Definitely not	14.1
Possible but not likely	37.9
Very likely	27
Almost certainly	9.8
Don't know	11.2

QUESTION 9B:

What do you think the chances are of the government reconciling with the Taliban in the next two years?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Definitely not	20.6
Possible but not likely	34.7
Very likely	21.7
Almost certainly	8.9
Don't know	14

QUESTION 9C:

How likely is it that the next president of Afghanistan will come to power through regularly scheduled elections?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Definitely not	9.8
Possible but not likely	23.8
Very likely	31.8
Almost certainly	23.7
Don't know	10.9

QUESTION 10A:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Country's Economy**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	10.8
About the same	48.4
Worse	38.5
Don't know/Not sure	2.3

QUESTION 10B:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Bribery and Corruption**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	8.2
About the same	35.2
Worse	53.9
Don't know/Not sure	2.7

QUESTION 10C:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Justice**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	12.9
About the same	44.1
Worse	39.4
Don't know/Not sure	3.5

QUESTION 10D:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Crime**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	10.4
About the same	35.6
Worse	50.3
Don't know/Not sure	3.7

QUESTION 10E:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Availability of Clean Drinking Water**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	35.9
About the same	46.5
Worse	16.4
Don't know/Not sure	1.1

QUESTION 10F:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Availability of Water for Irrigation**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	25.4
About the same	50.2
Worse	21.3
Don't know/Not sure	3.2

QUESTION 10G:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Supply of Electricity**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	19.1
About the same	44.7
Worse	34.1
Don't know/Not sure	2.1

QUESTION 10H:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Security Situation**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	15.6
About the same	42.1
Worse	41.1
Don't know/Not sure	1.2

QUESTION 10I:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Availability of Education for Children**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	45.4
About the same	39.9
Worse	13.8
Don't know/Not sure	0.9

QUESTION 10J:

Do you think that the condition has improved, is about the same, or is worse today than it was a year ago? **Freedom of Movement to Travel Where You Wish**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Improved	9.1
About the same	51.9
Worse	36.2
Don't know/Not sure	2.8

QUESTION 11A:

I am going to read several statements. For each say whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with it: **Citizens need more protection from the government.**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	1
Somewhat disagree	2.8
Neither agree nor disagree	7.3
Somewhat agree	26.7
Strongly agree	60.5
Don't know	1.7

QUESTION 11B:

Religious leaders should have an important role in government decisions.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	1.4
Somewhat disagree	7.4
Neither agree nor disagree	22.5
Somewhat agree	35.4
Strongly agree	31.1
Don't know	2.3

QUESTION 11C:

Politicians who were once commanders in the war should not be allowed to hold public office.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	5.7
Somewhat disagree	14
Neither agree nor disagree	14.8
Somewhat agree	21.9
Strongly agree	38.2
Don't know	5.4

QUESTION 11D:

Members of Parliament should make laws for this country, even if the President does not agree.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	4.6
Somewhat disagree	11.3
Neither agree nor disagree	13.7
Somewhat agree	22.3
Strongly agree	41.3
Don't know	6.8

QUESTION 11E:

Political parties only create division and confusion among the *qaums* of Afghanistan; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	3.1
Somewhat disagree	5.4
Neither agree nor disagree	13.6
Somewhat agree	21.2
Strongly agree	48.1
Don't know	8.6

QUESTION 11F:

In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Strongly disagree	8
Somewhat disagree	0
Neither agree nor disagree	14.6
Somewhat agree	22.9
Strongly agree	46.8
Don't know	7.7

QUESTION 12A:

For each one would you say that is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad way of governing Afghanistan? **Strong leadership without holding elections**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Bad	18.2
Fairly bad	12.7
Neither good nor bad	17.9
Fairly good	28.1
Very good	18.4
Don't know	4.7

QUESTION 12B:

Having experts rather than politicians make laws according to what they believe is best for the country.

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Bad	1.3
Fairly bad	5.1
Neither good nor bad	21
Fairly good	29
Very good	38.5
Don't know	5

QUESTION 12C:

Having religious leaders rule

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Bad	3.9
Fairly bad	8.1
Neither good nor bad	26.5
Fairly good	32.2
Very good	26.3
Don't know	3

QUESTION 12D:

Having elders and tribal leaders rule

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Bad	6.3
Fairly bad	9.4
Neither good nor bad	20.5
Fairly good	33.5
Very good	27.1
Don't know	3.3

QUESTION 12E:**Having elections to choose national and local leaders**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Bad	2.9
Fairly bad	9.3
Neither good nor bad	28.9
Fairly good	22.8
Very good	31.2
Don't know	4.9

QUESTION 13:**Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Afghanistan?**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Afghanistan is not a democracy	1.1
Not at all satisfied	29.3
Not very satisfied	19.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	22.6
Fairly satisfied	16
Very satisfied	9.3
Don't know	2

QUESTION 14A:**How likely do you think it is: That powerful people can find out how you voted, even though there is supposed to be a secret ballot in Afghanistan?**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Not at all likely	35.4
Not very likely	25.3
Neither likely nor unlikely	13.1
Somewhat likely	12
Very likely	6.1
Don't know	8.1

QUESTION 14B:**How likely do you think it is: That people can be punished by government officials if they make complaints about poor quality services or misuse of funds?**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Not at all likely	13.6
Not very likely	23.1
Neither likely nor unlikely	20.1
Somewhat likely	24.9
Very likely	9.3
Don't know	9

QUESTION 15A:

Members of Parliament of have different responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is **the most important** responsibility for Members of Parliament in this area?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Listen to voters and represent their needs	58.8
Deliver jobs or development to their province	21
Make laws for the good of the country	12
Monitor the president and his government	5
None of these	0.9
Don't know	2.2

QUESTION 15B:

Members of Parliament of have different responsibilities. Which of the following do you think is **the second most important** responsibility for Members of Parliament in this area?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Listen to voters and represent their needs	7.8
Deliver jobs or development to their province	29.3
Make laws for the good of the country	26.6
Monitor the president and his government	24.3
None of these	0
Don't know	12

QUESTION 16A:

Please tell me generally whether you have a lot, some or no confidence in the following:
Your district governor

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	22.4
Some confidence	29.2
No confidence	23.9
Refused	0
Don't know	24.6

QUESTION 16B:

The president

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	24.6
Some confidence	34
No confidence	39.8
Refused	0
Don't know	1.6

**QUESTION 16C:
The Wolesi Jirga**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	7.4
Some confidence	46.3
No confidence	42.7
Refused	0
Don't know	3.6

**QUESTION 16D:
The media**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	31
Some confidence	44.3
No confidence	20.1
Refused	0
Don't know	4.6

**QUESTION 16E:
Police**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	17.3
Some confidence	31.5
No confidence	47.9
Refused	0.2
Don't know	3.2

**QUESTION 16F:
Afghan National Army**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	29.7
Some confidence	25.1
No confidence	39.8
Refused	0.2
Don't know	5.1

QUESTION 16G:**Most people you meet on the street**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	10.9
Some confidence	30.6
No confidence	50.5
Refused	0
Don't know	8.1

QUESTION 16H:**Your neighbors**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	47.8
Some confidence	43.9
No confidence	6.6
Refused	0
Don't know	1.6

QUESTION 16I:**Village leader (*Malik/arbab/khan/qaryadar*)**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	35.2
Some confidence	51.1
No confidence	10.6
Refused	0.2
Don't know	2.8

QUESTION 16J:**Community development council**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	17.3
Some confidence	44.1
No confidence	29.4
Refused	0
Don't know	9.2

**QUESTION 16K:
Municipal officials**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	6.5
Some confidence	31.9
No confidence	53.6
Refused	0
Don't know	8

**QUESTION 16L:
Local Commanders**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	4.9
Some confidence	41.1
No confidence	45.7
Refused	1.4
Don't know	6.9

**QUESTION 16M:
Taliban**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	6.3
Some confidence	12.1
No confidence	72.6
Refused	3.2
Don't know	5.8

**QUESTION 16N:
The Independent Elections Committee**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	6.5
Some confidence	34.8
No confidence	50.4
Refused	0
Don't know	8.4

**QUESTION 16O:
The Supreme Court**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	9.2
Some confidence	27.5
No confidence	57.2
Refused	0
Don't know	6.2

**QUESTION 16P:
The Provincial Council**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	15.4
Some confidence	40.4
No confidence	30.2
Refused	0.7
Don't know	13.2

**QUESTION 16Q:
Political Parties**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
A lot of confidence	7.9
Some confidence	22.5
No confidence	58.7
Refused	0
Don't know	10.9

QUESTION 17:

With regard to the most recent 1388 presidential elections, which statement is true for you?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
You were not registered to vote or you were too young to vote	15.1
You voted in the elections	52.2
You decided not to vote	14.7
You could not find the polling station	0.9
You were prevented from voting	8.3
You did not have time to vote	3
You did not vote for some other reason	4.5
Don't know /Can't remember	1.3

QUESTION 18:

Do you plan to vote in the next election for president?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	48.2
Yes	40.4
Don't know	11.4

QUESTION 19:

How satisfied are you with the performance of President Karzai in the last ten years?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Very dissatisfied	14.4
Dissatisfied	14.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	25.4
Satisfied	26.1
Very satisfied	17.6
Don't know	1.8

QUESTION 20:

With regard to the most recent 1389 national assembly elections, which statement is true for you?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
You were not registered to vote or you were too young to vote	12.9
You voted in the elections	53.6
You decided not to vote	16.6
You could not find the polling station	0.7
You were prevented from voting	8.6
You did not have the time to vote	2.3
You did not vote for some other reason	3.5
Don't know/Don't remember	1.9

QUESTION 21A:If voted "yes"; can you tell me why you decided to vote? Please tell me the **top 3 reasons**:

Base: All Respondents 4287	(%)
To improve peace and security in Afghanistan	64.3
To improve people's lives	38.5
For my country	45.3
It is my duty to vote	34.7
to bring more service to my community	17.5
To elect my favorite candidate	13.1
To up the rights of Afghans	18.8
For Afghanistan's independence	19.5
My relatives or neighbors made me vote	2.9

QUESTION 21B:

If voted “no”; can you tell me about your reasons for not voting in these elections? Please tell me the **top 3 reasons**?

Base: All Respondents 1591	(%)
Insecurity, I feared attacks	44.3
I was not satisfied with the candidates, they are all corrupt	37.9
Because of fraud in previous elections	40.6
I did not trust the candidates	39.5
My vote does not make a difference	26.9
Other	2.2
My family or neighbors did not allow me to vote	9.3

QUESTION 22:

Thinking about the process of voting for the national assembly, which of the following statements is closest to your opinion?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
My vote was secret and other people do not know how I voted	45.8
My vote was not secret and other people do know how I voted	6.1
I did not vote in the election	43.9
Don't know	4.3

QUESTION 23:

In your opinion, did most people in your neighborhood turn out and vote in the election or did they stay home?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Most people voted	45.4
Most people stayed at home	44.1
Don't know	10.5

QUESTION 24:

Do you plan to vote in the next Wolesi Jirga elections?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	48.2
Yes	42.2
Don't know	9.6

QUESTION 25:

In your experience has the winner of Wolesi Jirga elections been able to improve quality of government services in your community?

Base: All Respondents 4386	(%)
No	71.9
Yes	16.1
Don't know	12.1
Refused	0

QUESTION 26:

Do you support a particular political party in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	83.7
Yes	16.3
Don't know	0
Refused	0

QUESTION 27A:Think about how political parties work in Afghanistan. In your opinion, how well do political parties: **Reflect the views of average citizens?**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Not at all well	36.2
Not very well	27.9
Well	17.5
Very well	6.1
Don't know	12.2

QUESTION 27B:**Promote policies that benefit all citizens of Afghanistan**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Not at all well	33.7
Not very well	28.8
Well	16.1
Very well	8.4
Don't know	13

QUESTION 27C:**Promote peace among *qaums***

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Not at all well	47.2
Not very well	21.9
Well	17.8
Very well	7.3
Don't know	5.8

QUESTION 28A:In your community, which of the following do you have: **Malik**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	0.3
Yes	99.7
Don't know	0

QUESTION 28B:**Shura/Jirga**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	14.7
Yes	81.2
Don't know	4.1

QUESTION 28C:**Mullah**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	0.5
Yes	99.5
Don't know	0

QUESTION 28D:**Community development council**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	22.8
Yes	68
Don't know	9.1

QUESTION 29A

How accessible do you consider the following organizations in your community?

Traditional Council (Shura/Jirga)

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	14.2
Not accessible at all	0.5
Not very accessible	12.5
Somewhat accessible	36
Very accessible	33.1
Don't know	3.7
Refused	0

QUESTION 29B:**Religious Leaders**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	0
Not accessible at all	0
Not very accessible	3.2
Somewhat accessible	35.7
Very accessible	59.8
Don't know	1.3
Refused	0

**QUESTION 29C:
National Assembly Members**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	61.8
Not accessible at all	27.1
Not very accessible	3
Somewhat accessible	2.7
Very accessible	1.1
Don't know	4.1
Refused	0.1

**QUESTION 29D:
Community Development Council Members**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	23.4
Not accessible at all	1.6
Not very accessible	0
Somewhat accessible	44.8
Very accessible	21.2
Don't know	9
Refused	0

**QUESTION 29E:
Provincial Council Members**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	8.6
Not accessible at all	52.3
Not very accessible	27.9
Somewhat accessible	5.7
Very accessible	1.2
Don't know	4.2
Refused	0.1

**QUESTION 29F:
Woluswali Officials**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	15.5
Not accessible at all	18.4
Not very accessible	31.9
Somewhat accessible	30.5
Very accessible	0
Don't know	3.3
Refused	0.2

**QUESTION 29G:
Wiloyat Officials**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Do not have this body in the community	57.2
Not accessible at all	17.5
Not very accessible	4.9
Somewhat accessible	8.4
Very accessible	7.7
Don't know	3.9
Refused	0.3

QUESTION 30A:

Can I ask about your land situation in your community? Do you own land?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	17.6
Yes	82.4
Don't know	0
Refused	0

QUESTION 30B:

If yes, do you have a legal title for this land issued by the state?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	66.6
Yes	31.2
Don't know	2.2
Refused	0

QUESTION 30C:

If yes, do you have a customary legal title for this land?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	10.3
Yes	88.6
Don't know	3.1
Refused	0

QUESTION 30D:

Do you rent land?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	81.2
Yes	18.8
Don't know	0
Refused	0

QUESTION 30E:

If yes, do you have a legal agreement to use rental land?

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
No	20.2
Yes	78.3
Don't know	1.5
Refused	0

QUESTION 31:

Would you say that with respect to the land that you own or rent, your land rights are:

Base: All Respondents 1669	(%)
Very insecure	3.1
Somewhat insecure	13.2
Somewhat secure	55.1
Extremely secure	28.6

QUESTION 32:

Have you ever had a dispute over land you own or rent?

Base: All Respondents 1669	(%)
No	73.2
Yes	26.8
Don't know	0
Refused	0

QUESTION 33:

Would you say that disputes over land you own are:

Base: All Respondents 536	(%)
Very uncommon	4
Somewhat uncommon	19.9
Somewhat common	52.5
Very common	23.6

QUESTION 34:

When you had a land dispute over land you own or rent, who did you turn to resolve the issue?

Base: All Respondents 536	(%)
Family	23.8
<i>Malik</i>	38.6
Shura/Jirga	11.2
<i>Woluswal</i> /Head of the district/ Head of police	12.5
Court	12.7
Community development council	1.4

QUESTION 35:

How satisfied were you with the procedures used to resolve the dispute?

Base: All Respondents 536	(%)
The dispute was not resolved	12.5
Not satisfied at all	12.8
Somewhat satisfied	46.7
Very satisfied	28

QUESTION 36A:

Generally do you think the following people do especially well or especially badly relative to other people in village meetings? **The Poor**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	11.8
Somewhat worse	11.7
The same	23
Somewhat better	21.7
Much better	11.6
Don't know	20.3
Refused	0

QUESTION 36B:

Older People

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	0
Somewhat worse	0
The same	30.9
Somewhat better	35
Much better	14.4
Don't know	19.7
Refused	0

QUESTION 36C:

Friends and family of the village elder

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	1.6
Somewhat worse	3.9
The same	25
Somewhat better	29.9
Much better	19.8
Don't know	19.7
Refused	0

QUESTION 36D:**People that are well connected with the local government**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	1.3
Somewhat worse	4.1
The same	24.5
Somewhat better	29.9
Much better	19.6
Don't know	20.4
Refused	0.1

QUESTION 36E:**People that are well connected with local commanders**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	1.7
Somewhat worse	5.2
The same	21.7
Somewhat better	26.6
Much better	23.1
Don't know	21.5
Refused	0.2

QUESTION 36F:**People that are well connected with members of parliament**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	1.4
Somewhat worse	3.6
The same	21.2
Somewhat better	25.9
Much better	25.6
Don't know	22.1
Refused	0.2

QUESTION 36G:**People that are well connected to CDC members**

Base: All Respondents 8620	(%)
Much worse	1.6
Somewhat worse	3.5
The same	24.1
Somewhat better	26.4
Much better	20.4
Don't know	24
Refused	0

SIMULATION 1: EXPLORING IMPACT OF CHANGE IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR WOLESI JIRGA

TREATMENT 1: NATIONAL ELECTION SIMULATION (SNTV; CONTROL TREATMENT)

QUESTION 37A:

“As you may be aware, in Afghanistan when you vote for the Wolesi Jirga you can vote for only one candidate. Despite the fact that you can only vote for one candidate several candidates will represent your province in the Wolesi Jirga. If you were voting in the Wolesi Jirga elections, which of these candidates would you vote for? You can vote for only one candidate.”

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Candidate 1 (Incumbent)	13
Candidate 2 (Educated in foreign countries)	42
Candidate 3 (Taliban-related)	1
Candidate 4 (Commander)	6
Candidate 5 (Female)	9
None of the above	27
Don't know	2
Refused	0

QUESTION 37B:

How satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very satisfied	26
Fairly satisfied	34
Not very satisfied	7
Not at all satisfied	29
Don't know	4
Refused	0

QUESTION 38A:

How important do you think your vote is in influencing the outcome of elections for the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	46
Somewhat important	37
Not very important	4
Not important at all	8
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 38B:

How important are National elections for the future of Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	54
Somewhat important	28
Not very important	10
Not important at all	3
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 39A:

How likely is it that a candidate who is elected to the Wolesi Jirga through such elections will actually do what they promise to do during the campaign?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	18
Somewhat likely	40
Not very likely	14
Not likely at all	22
Don't know	6
Refused	0

QUESTION 39B:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent groups in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	11
Somewhat likely	22
Not very likely	31
Not likely at all	28
Don't know	8
Refused	0

TREATMENT 2: NATIONAL ELECTION SIMULATION (FIRST-PAST-THE-POST; MAJORITARIAN)

QUESTION 37 VERSION 2:

“As you may be aware, in Afghanistan when you vote for the Wolesi Jirga you can vote for only one candidate. Despite the fact that you can only vote for one candidate, several candidates will represent your province in the Wolesi Jirga. Now I want you to think for a minute about different way of electing members of the Wolesi Jirga. Suppose now that you can vote in a different way. In this new system you can still only vote for one person, but this person would be the only person to represent your district in the Wolesi Jirga. That is, every district would have only one representative in the Wolesi Jirga. If you were voting in the Wolesi Jirga elections, which of these candidates would you vote for? You can vote for only one candidate.”

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Candidate 1 (Incumbent)	13
Candidate 2 (Educated in foreign countries)	41
Candidate 3 (Taliban-related)	1
Candidate 4 (Commander)	1
Candidate 5 (Female)	12
None of the above	28
Don't know	2
Refused	0

QUESTION 37B VERSION 2:

How satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very satisfied	30
Fairly satisfied	32
Not very satisfied	5
Not at all satisfied	32
Don't know	1
Refused	0

QUESTION 38A VERSION 2:

How important do you think your vote is in influencing the outcome of elections for the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	46
Somewhat important	37
Not very important	6
Not important at all	6
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 38B VERSION 2:

How important are National elections for the future of Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	57
Somewhat important	27
Not very important	8
Not important at all	3
Don't know	4
Refused	0

QUESTION 39A VERSION 2:

How likely is it that a candidate who is elected to the Wolesi Jirga through such elections will actually do what they promise to do during the campaign?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	17
Somewhat likely	40
Not very likely	13
Not likely at all	25
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 39B VERSION 2:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent groups in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	11
Somewhat likely	22
Not very likely	30
Not likely at all	29
Don't know	8
Refused	0

TREATMENT 3: NATIONAL ELECTION SIMULATION (SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE; PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION)

QUESTION 37A VERSION 3:

“As you may be aware, in Afghanistan when you vote for the Wolesi Jirga you can vote for only one candidate. Despite the fact that you can only vote for one candidate several candidates will represent your province in the Wolesi Jirga. Now I want you to think for a minute about different way of electing members of the Wolesi Jirga. Suppose now that you can vote in a different way. In this new system, you would be able to vote for more than one person. In fact, you would be able to vote in a way where each vote has different weight. Your most preferred candidate gets five votes, your second most preferred candidates receives four votes, your third most preferred candidate gets three votes and so on. When the election is finished, the number of everyone’s votes is totaled and the four candidates with the highest number of votes is elected.”

Base: All Respondents 2152	(%)
Candidate 1 (Incumbent)	38
Candidate 2 (Educated in foreign countries)	69
Candidate 3 (Taliban-related)	38
Candidate 4 (Commander)	24
Candidate 5 (Female)	39
None of the above	21
Don't know	2
Refused	0

QUESTION 37B VERSION 3:

How satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very satisfied	26
Fairly satisfied	38
Not very satisfied	11
Not at all satisfied	21
Don't know	4
Refused	0

QUESTION 38A VERSION 3:

How important do you think your vote is in influencing the outcome of elections for the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	36
Somewhat important	28
Not very important	11
Not important at all	19
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 38B VERSION 3:

How important are National elections for the future of Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	40
Somewhat important	25
Not very important	13
Not important at all	17
Don't know	5
Refused	0

QUESTION 39A VERSION 3:

How likely is it that a candidate who is elected to the Wolesi Jirga through such elections will actually do what they promise to do during the campaign?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	19
Somewhat likely	44
Not very likely	13
Not likely at all	18
Don't know	6
Refused	0

QUESTION 39B VERSION 3:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent groups in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	10
Somewhat likely	23
Not very likely	28
Not likely at all	27
Don't know	11
Refused	0

TREATMENT 4: NATIONAL ELECTION SIMULATION (BLOCK VOTE)

QUESTION 37A VERSION 4:

“As you may be aware, in Afghanistan when you vote for the Wolesi Jirga you can vote for only one candidate. Despite the fact that you can only vote for one candidate several candidates will represent your province in the Wolesi Jirga. Now I want you to think for a minute about different way of electing members of the Wolesi Jirga. Suppose now that you can vote in a different way. In this new system, you would be able to vote for more than one person. In this system there would be three people representing your province in the Wolesi Jirga. For this election, you would be able to vote for three candidates. When the votes are counted, the three candidates with the most votes will win and represent your province in the Wolesi Jirga.”

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Candidate 1 (Incumbent)	41
Candidate 2 (Educated in foreign countries)	60
Candidate 3 (Taliban-related)	23
Candidate 4 (Commander)	11
Candidate 5 (Female)	26
None of the above	28
Don't know	1
Refused	0

QUESTION 37B VERSION 4:

How satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very satisfied	26
Fairly satisfied	34
Not very satisfied	12
Not at all satisfied	25
Don't know	3
Refused	0

QUESTION 38A VERSION 4:

How important do you think your vote is in influencing the outcome of elections for the Wolesi Jirga?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	32
Somewhat important	27
Not very important	12
Not important at all	23
Don't know	6
Refused	0

QUESTION 38B VERSION 4:

How important are National elections for the future of Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very important	35
Somewhat important	24
Not very important	15
Not important at all	19
Don't know	8
Refused	0

QUESTION 39A VERSION 4:

How likely is it that a candidate who is elected to the Wolesi Jirga through such elections will actually do what they promise to do during the campaign?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	16
Somewhat likely	42
Not very likely	14
Not likely at all	21
Don't know	7
Refused	0

QUESTION 39B VERSION 4

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent groups in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 2155	(%)
Very likely	11
Somewhat likely	22
Not very likely	29
Not likely at all	27
Don't know	11
Refused	0

SIMULATION 2: VILLAGE COUNCIL ELECTIONS AND SUPPORT FOR THE STATE

TREATMENT 1: LOCAL ELECTION SIMULATION (SNTV; CONTROL TREATMENT)

“As you may know, the constitution of Afghanistan says that every village shall have a formal (*rasmī*) village council to be selected by the people of the country. Imagine that you are now able to vote for members of your village council. You would select members of this council the same way that you vote for members of the Wolesi Jirga and the Provincial Council. That is, you go to a polling station and select one person to represent you, although more than one person will actually be selected. As a result of this election, the individuals selected will become the formal village council that represents the interests of the village to the government.”

QUESTION 40 VERSION 1:

In your opinion how satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of your village council?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
Very satisfied	34
Fairly satisfied	47
Not very satisfied	9
Not at all satisfied	5
Don't know	4
Refused	0

QUESTION 41 VERSION 1:

In your opinion, how important are formal local elections for your village?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
Very important	49
Somewhat important	34
Not very important	9
Not important at all	5
Don't know	3
Refused	0

QUESTION 42A VERSION 1:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people who will be selected to represent your village through such elections will do what they promise to do?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
Very likely	27
Somewhat likely	54
Not very likely	10
Not likely at all	3
Don't know	6
Refused	0

QUESTION 42B VERSION 1:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people selected through this process will be able to defend the interests of your community to the *Woluswali*?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
Very likely	26
Somewhat likely	45
Not very likely	14
Not likely at all	4
Don't know	10
Refused	0

QUESTION 42C VERSION 1:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent group in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
Very likely	13
Somewhat likely	23
Not very likely	26
Not likely at all	27
Don't know	11
Refused	0

QUESTION 43 VERSION 1:

If you could select people to represent your ideas on your village who would:
Be your **first choice**?

Base: All Respondents 3390	(%)
School teacher	47
Mullah Saheb	21
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	14
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	9
Qamandon	2
Taliban representative	1
Other	2
Don't know	4
Refused	0

Be your **second choice**?

Base: All Respondents 3261	(%)
School teacher	19
Mullah Saheb	35
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	21
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	13
Qamandon	3
Taliban representative	1
Other	2
Don't know	6
Refused	0

Be your **third choice**?

Base: All Respondents 2478	(%)
School teacher	13
Mullah Saheb	13
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	26
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	22
Qamandon	8
Taliban representative	1
Other	6
Don't know	9
Refused	0

TREATMENT 2: LOCAL ELECTION SIMULATION (COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL ELECTIONS; CDC)

“As you may know, the constitution of Afghanistan says that every village shall have a formal (*rasmi*) village council to be selected by the people of the country. In the years to come, your village council will be the people you selected for your community development council. That is, a nongovernmental organization which organizes elections in your community and helps you select members of this council. But as a result of this election, the community development council and their members will become the formal village council that represents the interests of the village to the government.”

QUESTION 40 VERSION 2:

In your opinion how satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of your village council?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very satisfied	39
Fairly satisfied	42
Not very satisfied	10
Not at all satisfied	6
Don't know	3
Refused	0

QUESTION 41 VERSION 2:

In your opinion, how important are formal local elections for your village?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very important	49
Somewhat important	35
Not very important	8
Not important at all	6
Don't know	2
Refused	0

QUESTION 42A VERSION 2:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people who will be selected to represent your village through such elections will do what they promise to do?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	24
Somewhat likely	53
Not very likely	12
Not likely at all	5
Don't know	7
Refused	0

QUESTION 42B VERSION 2:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people selected through this process will be able to defend the interests of your community to the Woluswali?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	27
Somewhat likely	47
Not very likely	11
Not likely at all	5
Don't know	10
Refused	0

QUESTION 42C VERSION 2:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent group in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	13
Somewhat likely	20
Not very likely	31
Not likely at all	27
Don't know	9
Refused	0

QUESTION 43 VERSION 2:

If you could select people to represent your ideas on your village who would:
Be your **first choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
School teacher	47
Mullah Saheb	20
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	14
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	9
Qamandon	2
Taliban representative	1
Other	2
Don't know	4
Refused	0

Be your **second choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1562	(%)
School teacher	21
Mullah Saheb	34
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	22
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	14
Qamandon	4
Taliban representative	1
Other	2
Don't know	2
Refused	0

Be your **third choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1090	(%)
School teacher	14
Mullah Saheb	17
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	27
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	23
Qamandon	10
Taliban representative	2
Other	6
Don't know	0
Refused	0

TREATMENT 3: LOCAL ELECTION SIMULATION (CUSTOMARY ELECTIONS)

“As you may know, the constitution of Afghanistan says that every village shall have a formal (*rasm*) village council to be selected by the people of the country. In the years to come, your customary village council (shura/Jirga) will become the official village council for this community. That is, the people who participate in your village shura/Jirga will become official representatives to the village council.”

QUESTION 40 VERSION 3:

In your opinion how satisfied are you with this method for selecting members of your village council?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very satisfied	36
Fairly satisfied	43
Not very satisfied	11
Not at all satisfied	6
Don't know	4
Refused	0

QUESTION 41 VERSION 3:

In your opinion, how important are formal local elections for your village

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very important	46
Somewhat important	32
Not very important	11
Not important at all	5
Don't know	6
Refused	0

QUESTION 42A VERSION 3:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people who will be selected to represent your village through such elections will do what they promise to do?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	24
Somewhat likely	53
Not very likely	11
Not likely at all	5
Don't know	7
Refused	0

QUESTION 42B VERSION 3:

In your opinion, how likely is it that people selected through this process will be able to defend the interests of your community to the Woluswali?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	26
Somewhat likely	48
Not very likely	11
Not likely at all	4
Don't know	12
Refused	0

QUESTION 42C VERSION 3:

How likely would you be to support reconciliation with the Taliban or other insurgent group in Afghanistan?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
Very likely	27
Somewhat likely	44
Not very likely	11
Not likely at all	4
Don't know	14
Refused	0

QUESTION 43 VERSION 3:

If you could select people to represent your ideas on your village who would:
Be your **first choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1695	(%)
School teacher	51
Mullah Saheb	18
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	13
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	9
Qamandon	2
Taliban representative	2
Other	2
Don't know	4
Refused	0

Be your **second choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1548	(%)
School teacher	19
Mullah Saheb	35
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	22
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	16
Qamandon	5
Taliban representative	1
Other	2
Don't know	0
Refused	0

Be your **third choice**?

Base: All Respondents 1099	(%)
School teacher	14
Mullah Saheb	17
Malik/Arab/Khan/Qarydar	29
Rais-e Shura-ye Hambastagi	22
Qamandon	8
Taliban representative	3
Other	8
Don't know	0
Refused	0